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INTRODUCTION

One of the most perplexing problems with which labor, management, and the government have been concerned for many years is that
involving the so-called jurisdictional labor dispute. The method by
which such a dispute should be resolved is as difficult to determine as
settling the dispute itself. In 1947, Congress tried to solve the problem
of method by delegating authority to the National Labor Relations
Board "to hear and determine" jurisdictional disputes. The primary
purpose of this article which was inspired by a recent United States
Supreme Court decision-N.L.R.B. v. Radio and Television Broadcast
Engineers Union, Local 12121 is to explore the nature and scope of
the role of the Board in settling jurisdictional disputes. It was soon
discovered, however, that this objective could not be substantially
achieved without an examination of the law of jurisdictional disputes
as well. The article, therefore, is an endeavor to set forth and analyze
the substantive and procedural law developed by the Congress, the
National Labor Relations Board, and the Courts for the purpose of
resolving jurisdictional labor disputes. The Columbia BroadcastingSystem case is important because it involves the interpretation of the statutory authority of an administrative agency of the federal government
to settle by compulsory arbitration these disputes. The National Labor
Relations Board had respectfully disagreed with decisions of the Courts
4
of Appeals for the second, 2 third3 and seventh Circuits which had
*Ed. Note. This article is part one of a two part series. Part two will appear
in the next issue of the Marquette Law Review.
**Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, College of St.
Thomas; B.S.L., LL.B., LL.M., University of Minnesota Law School.
1364 U.S. 573 (1961), referred to herein as Columbia Broadcasting System.
2 N.L.R.B. v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, A.F.L.C.I.O. 272 F. 2d 713 (2d Cir. 1959).
3N.L.R.B. v. Assn. of Journeyman Plumbers & Pipefitters, Locals 420 & 428,
A.F.L., 39 L.R.R.M. 2629, 242 F. 2d 722 (3d Cir. 1957).
4 N.L.R.B. v. Carpenters Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., 43 L.R.R.M. 2132, 261 F. 2d
166 (7th Cir. 1958).
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interpreted the Labor Management Relations Act of 19475 as a directive
to the Board to settle jurisdictional disputes by a method of arbitration
which was in effect compulsory. The Columbia Broadcasting System
case provides an excellent opportunity for an article such as this to
consider not only the compulsory arbitration of jurisdictional disputes
but other phases of this labor problem as well. In Part One, we will be
concerned with (1) the nature and scope of the jurisdictional dispute,
(2) the status of jurisdictional disputes prior to 1947, (3) the National
Labor Relations Board as an administrative agency of the federal government, (4) the jurisdictional dispute provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, (5) the Board's decisions in
the early jurisdictional dispute cases, and (6) the administrative policy
governing jurisdictional dispute cases.
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE

Since different types of labor controversy have been designated as
"jurisdictional disputes," it seems appropriate at the outset to discuss
the nature and scope of the particular dispute which can be properly
called "jurisdictional." It is generally agreed that a jurisdictional dispute involves at least three parties-an employer and two competing
labor groups or classes. Certainly this would be so if the two labor
groups were labor unions. But, opinions do differ regarding the subject
of a jurisdictional dispute. The difficulty not only concerns the meaning
of "jurisdictional" but also the meaning of "dispute." Although the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, prohibits certain types of labor union activity which can be classified as "jurisdictional," 6 and directs the determination of the dispute out of which the
unfair labor practice has arisen,' Congress neither specifically defined
such a dispute nor used the phrase "jurisdictional dispute" in any of
its statutory provisions. However, the phrases "jurisdictional strike"
and "jurisdictional dispute" were used quite frequently in the discussion of these statutory provisions during the legislative process., Despite
the several meanings derived from the expression "jurisdictional dispute," common usage has confined its application to controversies between two or more labor organizations seeking the favor of an employer
in either one of two issues, namely, the right to be the collective bargaining representative of certain employees and the right to be assigned
certain work by an employer.
5Public Law 101, 80th Cong., 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §141 (1958). Ed.
Note. Hereafter the U.S.C. (1958) only shall be cited unless the statute was
enacted after 1958; then the statute and the U.S.C. Supp. shall be cited.
Statutes enacting code sections prior to U.S.C. (1958) are found in the
U.S.C. (1958) under "Historical Note".
6 Section 8(b) (4) (D), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (D) (1958).
7 Section 10(k), 29 U.S.C. §160(k) (1958).
8 See, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
Vols. 1 & 2, U. S. Govt. Printing Office (1948).
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When the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress
of Industrial Organization (CIO) existed as separate labor unions, the
National Labor Relations Board had occasion to consider various disputes between the two unions over work rights and representative status.
There were also disputes between two unions affiliated with the same
national labor organization. In one such early case, in which two unions
affiliated with the A. F. of L. claimed jurisdiction over certain jobs, the
Board refused to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the A. F. of
L. had "authority to decide such questions, acting through its annual
conventions or its Executive Council ....

,,1 The Board took note that

such "jurisdictional disputes" were not a "new phenomenon" and that
the A. F. of L. handled about 150 jurisdictional cases between 1917
and 1925, and fifty-two more between 1925 and 1931.10 The Board
called the dispute one over "a precise boundary line" and said it resembled "hundreds of other jurisdictional questions handled by the Federation and is clearly of a type which it has the power to decide."" In
these early cases dealing with jurisdictional problems, the Board applied
a policy expressed in the Aluminum Company case :12 It is preferable
that the Board should not interfere with the internal affairs of labor
organizations. Self-organization of employees implies a policy of self3
management."'
The Board continued to follow its policy of non-interference in
cases involving jurisdictional questions of representation if the two
unions were affiliated with the same central labor organization which
had authority to resolve the problem. In 1946, the Board said: "In the
past, we have, as a matter of policy, refused to permit rival unions
affiliated with the same parent organization to resort to the administrative processes of the Act for the settlement of representation disputes
where adequate and appropriate machinery was available to them, under
the procedure of the parent organization."' 14 The Board would decline
to exercise jurisdiction to settle "representation disputes" unless the
unions involved were not affiliates or the parent organization was unsuccessful in resolving such a dispute between two of its local unions.
9 Local 681, I.A.M. and Tobacco Workers Union, Local 16, (A-F Tobacco Co.)
1 N.L.R.B. 604, 610 (1936). See also, Vol. 1, Labor Relations Reference
Manual 111 (1936), published by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D.C. and hereinafter referred to as "L.R.R.M."
10 Id. 1 N.L.R.B. at 610.
11 Id. at 612.
12 Aluminum Workers Union, (Amoniman Company of Anerica) 1 N.L.R.B. 530,
1 L.R.R.M. 416 (1936).
1' Id. 1 L.R.R.M. at 421.
14 Local 835, Union of Operating Engineers, A.F.L., (Armnour & Co.) 68
N.L.R.B. 425, 18 L.R.R.M. 1123 (1946). See also Chemical Workers Union,
A.F.L., (U.S. Industrial Chemical, Inc.) 71 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 19 L.R.R.M.
1073 (1947). A summary of the Board's policy in these cases is stated in
Eleventh Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1946, Chap. II, and reported in 19 L.R.R.M. 62 (1946).
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The Board, therefore, had stated that where "the parent organization
could not secure from the disputants compliance with its orders" the
Board would direct "elections to designate bargaining agents despite the
jurisdictional dispute."' 15 These cases not only disclose the Board's early
policy in the settlement of "representation disputes" but also treat such
16
disputes as "jurisdictional."'
It was the general opinion of the courts that representation disputes
fell within the definition of "labor dispute" contained in the NorrisLaGuardia Act.' 7 The employer, therefore, was prevented from securing an injunction against peaceful and otherwise lawful strikes and
picketing by the unsuccessful union' without complying with the statutory prerequisites for securing such injunctions.' Thus, in one case,'20
where the employer bargained with a union representing a majority of
the employees and the minority union picketed in protest, the Court
said: ".

..

(W)e think it so clear under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and

the National Labor Relations Act, considered together, that the controversy involved in the instant case is a labor dispute and that only the
National Labor Relations Board in the first instance can end that dispute by certification, and that no injunction can issue under the NorrisLaGuardia Act in the absence of the findings required thereby, that
we must enforce this plain intent of the statute without regard for the
hardship of the employer."' 2 ' In another case, 22 the Company bargained

with the United Steelworkers which had been certified by the National
Labor Relations Board after winning an election. The Company refused
the defendant union's request for recognition as collective bargaining
representative for eight non-production workers, all of whom were included in the contract with the certified union. The Court said it was
"constrained to hold that a jurisdictional strike or controversy wherein
one union is engaging in an argument with another union over which
union shall represent the employees of a particular concern

. .

. (falls)

within the terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the court is powerless to enjoin the acts complained of in the bill."' 2" The Court then

stated that it came "to this conclusion of law with a firm conviction
I' Local 51 Lithographers Union, A.F.L., (Foote & Davies) 66 N.L.R.B. 416, 17
L.R.R.M. 313 (1946).
16 In its Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 15, the Board speaks about the
"determination of representatives in cases involving jurisdictional disputes ... "
17 Public Law 65, 72d Cong., 47 Stat. 70 §13 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §113 (1958).
18 Section 4, 29 U.S.C. §104 (1958).
19 Sections 7 and 8, 29 U.S.C. §§107, 108 (1958).
20 Local 72, Fur Workers Union v. Fur Workers Union 21238, 105 F. 2d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1939), aff'd per curiam, 308 U.S. 522 (1939).
2Id. 105 F. 2d at 17.
22 American Chain & Cable Co. v. Local 676, Truck Drivers Union, A.F.L., 68
F. Supp. 54 (D. N.J. 1946).
2Id. at 63.
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that all morals and equity are on the side of the employer, who without
cause of his own, finds himself enmeshed in such a controversy and
faces the loss of his business and is powerless to prevent it. '' 24
Enough has been covered in this brief discussion of the so-called
"representation dispute" to understand its nature and scope as well as
the problems of the parties involved. The problem of continued picketing by the unsuccessful union after certification of another union by the
National Labor Relations Board was resolved by the enactment in 1947,
of section 8(b) (4) (C) of the Labor Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act.25 Additional provisions covering so-called "recognitional
picketing" were inserted in the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.26 Section 8(b) (7) of the new Act prohibits
recognitional picketing by an uncertified union where: (A) the employer has lawfully recognized another labor organization, (B) a valid
election has been held under section 9(c) within the preceding twelve
months, or (C) such picketing is conducted without the filing within
30 days of a petition for an election under section 9(c). Subparagraph
(C), however, permits picketing for purposes of "advising the public"
that an employer is non-union unless the picketing induces employees
of other employers to refuse to perform their services.
Let us now try to resolve the problem of equivocal usage of "jurisdictional dispute." We have seen that a dispute between two or more
labor unions competing for the right to be the collective bargaining
representative of a group of employees has been called "jurisdictional."
On the other hand, two unions may be in agreement concerning the
right of each to represent different groups of employees but be in dispute over whose members are to perform certain work supplied by an
employer. Such a controversy has also been called a jurisdictional dispute. On the surface, this type of dispute would seem to present no real
problem since one can easily conclude that carpenters should perform
carpentry, plumbers should do plumbing, and so on. Unfortunately, it
is not that simple. The employer may be confronted with the task of
assigning a particular type of work which involves a composition of
talents and training possessed by members of two or more labor organizations. Each union claims that the work in question should be assigned
to the employees who are its members; or if its members are not yet
employed, the employer should then hire its members to perform the
24 Ibid.

25 This section declares an unfair labor practice to exist upon "forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has
been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions
of section 9."
26 Public Law 86-257, 86th Cong., 73 Stat. 519 §704(b) (1959), 29 U.S.C. §158

(b) (7) (Supp. II, 1961).
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work involved. It should be noted at this point that conflicting work
claims are not peculiar to labor unions. Witness, for example, the sometimes overlapping areas of work performed by those engaged in physical well-being such as physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and chiropractors. And decide, if you will, the point where a public accountant
practices law in the preparation of income tax returns and the point
where the lawyer doing the same work practices accounting. To be sure,
the professional organizations in question are understandably concerned
about the "work-rights" of their respective memberships. It is only
natural, then, that any organization whose membership is composed of
persons having similar talents and training, whether it be a labor union
or a professional association, will strive to protect the area of its competence from encroachment by those whom it considers not so trained
or talented.
In the field of labor relations, which type of dispute is really jurisdictional? Is it the dispute over representative rights? Or, is it the dispute over jobs? The answer depends upon an analysis of (1) the word
"jurisdiction," (2) the basis for each type of claim, and (3) the parties
involved. Since "jurisdiction" can be equated with the "right" or
"authority" to exercise certain power, it is apparent that each dispute
can be classified as jurisdictional since each concerns the assertion of a
right or authority-the one to represent certain employees and the other
to perform certain tasks. The respective claims in either situation can
also be based on an existing collective bargaining contract or Board
certification or upon tradition, employment history, and character of the
work generally performed by the members of the disputing unions. If,
then, a distinction is to be made between the two labor controversies,
it must depend on the analysis of the status of the parties. Of course,
each situation usually involves two or more labor unions. But, who is
the real third party? The so-called "representation dispute" involves
employees, and the other dispute involves work. Although it is true that
a union solicits employer recognition in seeking representative status,
the National Labor Relations Act provides that only "representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
-27 The National Labor
.. . or other conditions of employment ....
"(The Act) refollows:
as
law
the
interpreted
has
Relations Board
selected by a
representative
the
with
quires that an employer bargain
bargaincollective
for
appropriate
unit
majority of his employees in a
by
selected
be
representative
ing. But the Act does not require that the
27

Section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (1958).
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any particular procedure as long as the representative is clearly the
As one method for employchoice of a majority of the employees ....
Act
authorizes the Board to
the
ees to select a majority representative,
may formally certify
Board
The
.
.
.
conduct representation elections.
case only upon
a
representation
a collective-bargaining representative in
the basis of the results of a Board-conducted election.... The Act also
empowers the Board to conduct elections to decertify incumbent bargaining agents which have been previously certified or -which are being
'
It appears, therefore, that the
currently recognized by the employer."2
relationship between two labor unions seeking the same representative
status is one of "contestants" and not one of "disputants" since each
of the unions is actually soliciting the support of a majority of the
employees in question to act as the collective bargaining agent of their
unit or group. And, since the prize in such a contest is "representation,"
it would seem appropriate to call it a "Representational Contest" and
not a jurisdictional dispute.
On the other hand, when two labor unions are seeking the same
work assignment, their claims are presented to the employer. It is his
favor that each is seeking. The difficulty arises when he assigns the
work to one of the unions or to his own non-union employees. The
unsuccessful union objects and disputes not only the right of the other
union or non-union group to perform the work but also the employer's
right to make such an assignment. In this type of situation, there is
actual controversy involving three or more parties. It is quite true that
the unsuccessful union might not have any of the particular employer's
employees in its membership at the time of the dispute; and, therefore,
it appears that the disputing union is seeking representative status. But,
the main point in this type of controversy is that members of the unsuccessful and disputing union, if it is ultimately successful in its subsequent picketing against the employer, would replace the employees to
whom the employer has assigned the jobs. The work assignment dispute
is therefore over jobs and not employees. It is not a popularity contest.
There is no campaign among employees to solicit their votes. The primary objective of the disputing unions prior to an assignment of the
work in question is to obtain the assignment in preference to members
of the other union or of any other contending group. Usually, however,
if a strike or picketing occurs, it is after the employer has made an
assignment of the disputed work. The main objective, then, of the disputing or unsuccessful union is the re-assignment of the disputed work
2s8Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., for the fiscal year 1960, p. 21.
It should be noted that the Board on May 15, 1961, pursuant to authority
granted by an amendment to the National Labor Relations Act in 1959, delegated "to its regional directors its powers under section 9 to determine"
representation questions subject to review by the Board. The power to so
delegate is contained in section 3 (b) of the Act.
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to the exclusion of those to whom the employer has already assigned
the work. We are compelled to conclude, therefore, that the work-assignment problem is by its very nature a dispute involving claims of inherent rights and is properly called a "Jurisdictional Dispute."
There remains, however, one area in which the difference between
representational and jurisdictional cases is not an easy one to determine.
This difficulty was manifested in the first as well as subsequent cases
to come before the National Labor Relations Board involving the application of the 1947 statutory provisions dealing with jurisdictional dis29
putes. The representation section of the National Labor Relations Act
includes a provision that "in order to assure to employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act" the Board is
authorized in representational cases to decide, subject to certain limita30
tions, "the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The view is therefore expressed in some cases that the Board should
exercise its jurisdiction under section 9(b) of the Act by determining
the appropriate bargaining unit and not under section 10(k) which provides for determination by the Board of jurisdictional disputes. This,
indeed, is a real and complicated problem which is discussed in our
subsequent consideration of the early cases involving the determination
of jurisdictional disputes by the National Labor Relations Board.
THE STATUS OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES PRIOR TO 1947
We can enhance our understanding of the existing law governing
jurisdictional disputes if we examine their status and legality prior to
their statutory regulation in 1947. One of the leading opinions on the
pre-1947 legality of jurisdictional disputes was contained in the 1941
decision of the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Hutcheson et
aL31 In this case, conflicting claims of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and the International Association of Machinists were presented
in regard to the erection and dismantling of machinery, which had been
a source of controversy between the two unions for many years. Rejection of the Carpenter's claim by the employer resulted in a strike and
picketing by the Carpenters against the employer and a boycott of
his product. The union was then charged by the United States Govern32
ment with a violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act. The union
claimed its activity was privileged under the anti-injunction provisions
of section 20 of the Clayton Act.3 In discussing whether a jurisdictional
strike falls within the area of labor activity protected by section 20, the
Court said:
29 Section 9, 29 U.S.C. §159 (1958).
30 Section 9(b), 29 U.S.C. §159(b)

31312

(1958).

U.S.219 (1941).

3226 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958).
33 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 29 U.S.C. §52 (1958).
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There is nothing remotely within the terms of section 20 that
differentiates between trade union conduct directed against an
employer because of a controversy arising in the relation between
an employer and employee, as such, and conduct similarly directed but ultimately due to an internecine struggle between two
unions seeking the favor of the same employer. Such strife between competing unions . . .has undoubtedly been one of the

potent forces in the modem development of industrial unions.
These conflicts have intensified industrial tension but there is not
20
the slightest warrant for saying that Congress made section
4
inapplicable to trade union conduct resulting from them.
The Supreme Court went on to comment that as far as the Clayton Act
was concerned "we must dispose of this case as though we had before
us precisely the same conduct on the part of the defendants in pressing
claims . . . for increased wages, or shorter hours, or other elements of
35
what are called working conditions. 3 The Court's conclusion was that

jurisdictional strikes and picketing were the type of labor activity protected by the anti-injunction provisions of section 20 of the Clayton Act.
Despite the ruling in the Hutcheson case which treated a dispute
between two unions over the right to particular work as the equivalent
of a dispute between a union and an employer over regular and ordinary employment conditions, such as wages and hours, jurisdictional
labor union disputes were not favorably received by either management,
labor, or the government. There is general, if not unanimous, agreement by all parties concerned that jurisdictional dispute activity is contrary to the public interest and does not benefit either the labor movement or management. This feeling was apparent in the legislative discussions prior to the enactment of the amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act in 1947.
The legislative history of the current federal statutory regulations
affecting jurisdictional union activity reveals ample evidence of a general agreement on the need for such governmental control. The Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare said that the "jurisdictional
dispute" was one of the "union practices (which) witnesses and committee members were in substantial accord . . . should be subject to

Federal regulation."36 The House Committee on Education and Labor
said in its report that the jurisdictional strike did not "arise out of any
dispute between an employer and employees (and that) more often than
not the employers are powerless to comply with demands giving rise
The House Minority Report, which in general
to the activities. . .. ,,37
34 Supra note 31, at 232.
at 232-33.
3d.
36 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947), 1 Legislative History of the

Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 113.
STH.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), 1 Legislative History of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 314.
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was opposed to the labor regulations as set forth in the proposed legislation before the House, agreed: "No one can deny that labor unions
have engaged in some activities that are so clearly unjustified that this
Congress can and should legislate against them immediately. These were
covered by the President in his State of the Union Message when he
urged legislation to prevent: (1) Jurisdictional Strikes. .."3 The Senate Minority Report concurred: "We agree with President Truman's
statement in his State of the Union message that 'jurisdictional strikes
are indefensible.' 39
Sentiment for peaceful and voluntary settlement of jurisdictional
disputes also prevailed within the labor movement as revealed by the
following excerpt from the Labor Relations Reference Manual:
A plan for strikeless settlement of work-jurisdiction disputes
among certain AFL craft unions for submission of conflicting
claims to arbitration as a final report was unanimously approved
in October, 1946, at a convention of the Metal Trades Department
held in conjunction with the national convention of the American
Federation of Labor .... The plan was recommended by a special committee of craft-union representatives. . . .Commenting
on the proposal, the committee stated: 'For any of us to soothe
our conscience with the threadbare declaration that 'jurisdictional
disputes have always been with us and always will be' is an unsuccessful attempt to shirk our responsibilities and evade the
challenge of our ability to deal effectively with this problem....
Every collective bargaining agreement is only as durable as the
pledged honor and good faith of those who sign it. If contractual
relations with employers are to endure-to say nothing of their
being strengthened, cemented and being more extensively applied,
then we are compelled to make good on our own promise to the
same extent that we insist upon the employer making good on his.
Therefore, we must find an effective way to definitely end illegal
work stoppages that stem from jurisdictional controversies.'"
In the recent Columbia Broadcasting System case, 41 the Supreme
Court reviewed the conditions which had necessitated government intervention in 1947, in the regulation of jurisdictional disputes:
Prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, labor, business and the public in general had for a long time joined in hopeful efforts to escape the disruptive consequences of jurisdictional
disputes and resulting work stoppages. To this end unions had
established union tribunals, employers had established employer
tribunals, and both had set up joint tribunals to arbitrate such disputes. Each of these efforts had helped some but none had
1st Sess. 95 (1947), 1 Legislative
History of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 386.
39 S. Minority Rep. No. 105, Part 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947), 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 480.
40 18 L.R.R.M. 68-69 (1946).
41
Supra note 1.
38H.R. Minority Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
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achieved complete success. The result was a continuing and widely expressed dissatisfaction with jurisdictional strikes. 42
The Supreme Court, citing the Congressional Record, 43 also noted that
"President Truman told the Congress in 1947 that disputes 'involving
the question of which labor union is entitled to perform a particular
task' should be settled, and that if the 'rival unions are unable to settle
such disputes themselves, provision must be made for peaceful and
44
binding determination of the issues'."
With this background, Congress enacted, as part of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, certain provisions regulating jurisdictional disputes. For many years, the National Labor Relations Board
was persistent in its position that one of these provisions, namely, its
power "to hear and determine" jurisdictional disputes under section
10(k), did not delegate to it the authority of compulsory arbitration. In
the Columbia Broadcasting System case, the Board used no less than six
arguments in an effort to convince the Supreme Court that the Board
should not exercise such power in its jurisdictional dispute cases. The
Supreme Court tells the Board, however, that the policy it had followed
is contrary to the purpose of the Act--"to provide an effective compulsory method of getting rid of what were deemed to be the bad consequences of jurisdictional disputes." 45 The Supreme Court, therefore,
went on to hold that the Board is obliged in jurisdictional dispute cases
to decide which of the competing unions is properly entitled to the disputed work and that the Board must abandon its policy of merely deciding whether the union charged with a violation of the National Labor
Relations Act has actually engaged in proscribed jurisdictional activity.
Did Congress intend to delegate to the Board powers of compulsory
arbitration in jurisdictional dispute cases? Is this an impossible task for
an administrative agency to perform effectively? As a preface to our
discussion of the federal statutory provisions pertaining to jurisdictional
disputes and to understand more clearly the role of the National Labor
Relations Board in the settlement of such disputes thereunder, it is appropriate for us to consider the Board's status as an administrative
agency of the federal government.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AS AN

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

The National Labor Relations Board was created in 1935, by an Act
of Congress to administer the policy of the National Labor Relations
Act "by encouraging the practice of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-or42 Supra note 1, at 580.
43 93 Cong. Rec. 136 (1947).
44Supranote 42.
45 Supra note 1, at 582.
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ganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em46
ployment or other mutual aid or protection."' In 1947, Congress declared that the policy of the National Labor Relations Act was also to
prohibit "certain practices by some labor organizations . . . obstructing
commerce . . . through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or

through concerted activities which impair the interest of the public in
the free flow of such commerce.""7 Congress further declared that "the
purpose and policy" of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
was "to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the
interference by either" employees or employers with the lawful "rights
of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which
affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect
the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce." 4s5 These, then, are the objectives to be achieved by the National
Labor Relations Board in the exercise of its administrative powers. Our
purpose is not to conduct an exhaustive study of the Board as an administrative agency of the federal government but merely to consider
briefly this aspect of the Board's status as a prerequisite to a better
understanding of the Board's role in the determination of jurisdictional
disputes.
The powers of the National Labor Relations Board can be described
as quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. Such powers are not unique to the
Board, for indeed they are possessed by most, if not all, federal regulatory agencies. But, the administrative agency, especially the independent board or commission, is in a sense quite unique. It is usually
created by the legislature for the purpose of regulating some special
phase of our economy or society; so it is created to enact and promulgate rules and regulations which are inherently legislative in character
but which the legislature decides are too detailed, specialized and timeconsuming to necessitate the regular and constant attention of the
legislature itself. Therefore, the quasi-legislative authority is delegated
to the administrative agency, and the agency is, in a sense, a branch of
the legislature. Although the administrative agency is usually created
by the legislature, its members are normally chosen by the executive to
administer and enforce the law which created their agency and author"Findings and Policies" of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), 29 U.S.C. §151 (1958). The Board was created by section 3(a).
4 Amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, supra note 5,
to the "Findings and Policies" of the National Labor Relations Act, supra
note 46.
48 "Declaration of Policy" of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
supra note 5, §1 (b), 2d paragraph.
46
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ized their appointment. So, in another sense, the administrative agency
is a part of the executive branch of government. However, the prime
function of the regulatory administrative agency, such as the National
Labor Relations Board, is to find and determine facts concerning the
application of the law with which it has been charged the responsibility
of enforcing. Of course this function of the administrative agency is
primarily judicial in character and can involve not only the resolution
of purely factual questions but also questions of law or questions of
mixed law and fact. Ordinarily, administrative findings of fact are not
subject to judicial review if they are supported by substantial evidence
and there was no irregularity in the administrative proceeding.
The federal regulatory agency, then, carries out its functions on
behalf of all three branches of government-executive, legislative, and
judicial. To be sure, each of these branches of government would find
it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to perorm its own phase of the
tasks which the administrative agency performs as a unit on its behalf.
In fact, the invention of the regulatory administrative agency is a
happy compromise to the constitutionally interpreted doctrine of separation of powers which was intended to prevent encroachment by one
branch upon the powers of the other or the relinquishment by one of
its powers in favor of the other.
The organizational structure of the National Labor Relations Board
is composed of a five-member Board appointed for terms of five years
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, 49 the Office
of the General Counsel who is similarly appointed but for a term of
four years, 50 and the Division of Trial Examiners who are appointed
by the Board. 51 And, for the day by day administration of the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board acts through
52
regional directors and their respective staffs.
Legislatively, the Board is authorized "to make, amend, and rescind,
in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act,5 3 such

rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of" the federal labor Act. 54 The Board also publishes, pursuant to the
4PNational Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 3(a), 29 U.S.C. §153(a)
(1958).
50 Section 3(d), 29 U.S.C. §153(d) (1958).
51 Section 4(a), 29 U.S.C. §154(a) (1958).
52 Ibid.
5360 Stat. 237, §§2 (c), 3 (a), 4 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§1001 (c), 1002 (a), 1003 (1958).
54 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 6, 29 U.S.C. §156 (1958).
The Board's current Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure
are designated as Series 8, issued on November 4, 1959, and published in the
Federal Register on November 7, 1959, 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), effective
November 13, 1959, and subsequently amended, May 15, 1961, and August 15,
1961.
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Administrative Procedure Act,55 "statements of the general course and

method by which its functions are channeled and determined." 56
Judicially, the National Labor Relations Board is authorized to hear
and decide issues in two types of cases. First, the Board has authority to
conduct hearings concerning "a question of representation affecting
commerce" and upon a finding on the basis of "the record of such
hearing that such a question of representation exists . . . direct an

election" to certify or decertify a labor organization as a collective bargaining agent. 57 The Board's authority to conduct elections is not, however, confined to purely representational issues, for the Act delegates
to the Board the power to conduct elections and certify their results to
determine the question of rescission of a collective bargaining agent's authority to enter into a union-shop agreement with an employer. 58 In representation cases, the Board is also authorized to decide, to "assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by
(the) Act, the unit (of employees) appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.

' 59

In 1959, Congress granted to the National Labor Relations Board
permission "to delegate to its regional directors its" power to decide
representation questions.6" In accordance therewith, the Board, on May
15, 1961, amended its rules, regulations and procedure to authorize the
regional directors to exercise the powers of the Board "under section
9 to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and determine whether
a question of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a
secret ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 9 and certify the
results thereof."' 6' Review of the directors' decisions in such cases is
possible in certain instances. 62 The effect and purpose of the delegation
of the Board's discretionary powers in representation cases is set forth
in the following comment by Board Chairman McCulloch:
55 Supra note 53, section 3(a) (2), 5 U.S.C. §1002(a) (2) (1958).
56 Section 101.1, Statements of Procedure, supra note 54.
57National Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 9(c) (1), 29 U.S.C. §159
(c)(1)(1958).
5sNational Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 9(e), 29 U.S.C. §159(e)
(1958).
59 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 9(b), 29 U.S.C. §159(b)
(1958).
60 An Amendment to the National Labor Relations Act, section 3(b), by the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Public Law 86-257, Title
VII, 86th Cong., 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
61National Labor Relations Act, supra, note 60. See also Text of Statement
issued by the National Labor Relations Board, May 4, 1961, Labor Relations

Expediter 4204, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Wash., D.C.

62 Review if allowed: (1) if Board precedent does not exist or has not been

followed in a director's decision, (2) if a prejudicial error has resulted from
a director's decision of substantial fact, (3) if the conduct of the hearing or
a ruling is in error and prejudicial, or (4) if the Board feels compelled to
reconsider its own rule or policy. 48 Labor Relations Reporter 1, 2, Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc., Wash., D.C.
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This delegation of decision making and other powers by the
Board to its Regional Directors promises to be one of the most
far-reaching steps the Board has ever taken with respect to its
election cases.
It should provide a major speed-up in NLRB case handling
in line with the policy of President Kennedy for the independent
regulatory agencies. By relieving the Board of a substantial part
of its total case load in the future, the new plan will free the
Board to reduce its large backlog and dispose of its other cases
involving unfair labor practices more promptly and carefully....
The NLRB has been faced with a steady increase of represeritation and unfair labor practice cases in recent years, which
has tended to slow down the decisional processes of the Board.
The National Labor Policy of protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of collective bargaining representatives of their own choosing,
will most certainly be implemented by Board measures to resolve
questions of representation more quickly. But the Board is also
retaining a limited form of review to enable it to take final reor policy are
sponsibility to see that
63 substantial questions of law
consistently applied.
The second type of case in which the National Labor Relations
Board exercises "judicial" authority concerns the question of statutory
violation. The National Labor Relations Act empowers the Board "to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed
in section 8) affecting commerce." 4 As originally delegated in 1935,
this power of the Board was "exclusive," but this term was deleted in
1947, when the Labor Management Relations Act authorized the federal
district courts to exercise their jurisdiction in issuing injunctions against
unfair labor practices,65 and to award damages to any person "injured
in his business or property by reason" of the occurrence of any one of
the acts proscribed by section 8(b) (4) of the Act.6"
It is apparent that the role of the National Labor Relations Board
in the labor relations of businesses engaged in, or affecting, interstate
commerce is primarily one involving the adjudication of matters which
depend upon an interpretation and application of the regulatory statute
the Board has the responsibility to enforce. In discussing the reorganization of the Board prior to passage of the 1947 amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare commented "it is the belief of the committee that Con6348
64

Labor Relations Reporter 2, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Wash., D.C.

Section 10(a), 29 U.S.C. §160(a) (1958).

65 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, sections 10(j) and 10(L), 29
U.S.C. §§160(j), 160(1) (1958).
66 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 303(b), 29 U.S.C. §187(b)
(1958). See, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947), 1
Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 556

for explanation that these were the two reasons which caused the deletion
of the term "exclusive" in section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.
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gress intended the Board to function like a court" and that "the Board's
function is largely a judicial one."67 The National Labor Relations Act
thus provides that whenever an unfair labor practice is charged, the
Board "shall have power to issue and cause to be served ... a complaint
stating the charges . . .and containing a notice of hearing before the

Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency."'68
Substantiating the judicial nature of an unfair labor practice case, the
Act further states: "Any such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be
conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the
district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure
."" To perform effectively
for the district courts of the United States. .".
the conduct "of all hearings and investigations" pertaining to representation and unfair labor practice cases, the Board is authorized by
the Act to issue "subpoenas" requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses or the production of evidence.., which, in the opinion of the
Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested
in it by (the Act).

' 70

The National Labor Relations Act continues to treat in judicial
terms the authority of the Board to decide the existence of alleged
unfair labor practices by providing: "If upon the preponderance of the
testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person
named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to
take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this

Act... ."71 Itshould be noted, however, that here the similarity between
the procedure of the Board and that of a court comes to an end, for
the decision of a court is usually in the form of a judgment or decree.
The decision of the Board, on the other hand, is in the form of a cease
and desist order which is not the equivalent of an injunction.7 2 An
injunction can be decreed only by a judicial tribunal whose jurisdiction
in equity has been properly invoked, and if it is violated by the party
enjoined, the party is in contempt of court. The Board's remedial power
in unfair labor practice cases is usually exercised in the form of an order
that: (1) the employer or labor union post notices that particular unlawful acts are not to be continued, (2) the employer and labor union
Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947), 1 Legislative History of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 415.
68 Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. §160(b) (1958).
69 Ibid.
7oSection 11(1), 29 U.S.C. §161(1) (1958).
71 Section 10 (c), 29 U.S.C. §160 (c) (1958), (Italics supplied).
72 It should be also mentioned, of course, that the procedure of a hearing before
the National Labor Relations Board, as before all administrative agencies,
is more informal than that at a judicial proceeding.
67 S.

19611
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resume collective bargaining, (3) the employer discontinue the domination of a union, (4) the employer cease recognition of a union which
the employer is unlawfully assisting, (5) employees discriminatorily
discharged be reinstated, and (6) the employer or union, or both, reimburse jointly or severally an employee for back pay because of loss of
73
his job in violation of the Act.

Despite the judicial nature of its proceedings, the National Labor
Relations Board is still an administrative agency of government and
does not possess the power to sanction violations of its cease and desist
orders, nor does it have the power to adjudge such violators in contempt
of the Board. The National Labor Relations Act recognizes this by
providing that the Board can petition the appropriate Circuit Court of
Appeals for the enforcement of Board orders, but on such appeal "(t)he
findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 74 Although, as we have seen, the principle of conclusiveness of
administrative findings of fact is applicable to other administrative
agencies, the United States Supreme Court has expressed an even
greater confidence in the decisions of the National Labor Relations
Board by stating that in addition to the conclusive effect given the
Board's findings of fact "the Board's interpretation of the Act and the
75
Board's application of it in doubtful situations are entitled to weight.
Although the five members of the Board handle many cases, 76 "(t) he
great bulk of cases filed with the NLRB are handled to conclusion in
various stages without reaching the Board Members for consideration
and decision.

7 7

This would not be possible without the expert assist-

ance of the General Counsel, the Regional Directors, and their respective staffs, and the Trial Examiners.' The General Counsel has "final
'1 Fourteenth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., for the fiscal year 1949, pp. 3, 4.
74 Section 10(e), 29 U.S.C. §160(e) (1958).
75 N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
76 "A total of 4,122 cases of all types went to decision by the Board Members,
(for 1960) by far the largest number in a single fiscal year. The figure was
43 percent above the 1959 total." Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B.,
fiscal year 1960, p. 4.
77 Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1960, p. 4. The same
Report also states, at p. 8: "As of the end of fiscal 1960, approximately 87
percent of all cases brought before the agency were disposed of by way of
dismissal, withdrawal, or settlement, on an average within 30 days of the
filing of the charge - a record accomplishment."
78 The Board reports that fiscal 1960 "was a record-setting one" for the Agency
because: "A. Decisions in the greatest number of contested cases . . .- 3,239were handed down. B. Decisions in more unfair labor practice cases -1,456were issued. C. More unfair labor practice cases were handled to conclusion
-11,924-by decision, settlement, withdrawal, or dismissal. D. More hearings
were held. E. Trial Examiners conducted hearings in
in all cases -4,420and issued findings and recommore unfair labor practice cases -1,474mendations . . . in more cases -1,226. F. Formal complaints were issued by
than in any
the General Counsel in more unfair labor practice cases -2,141H. More
other year. G. More petitions for injunctions -224-- were filed ....
was recovered for employees by voluntary settlement of
backpay -$683,030-
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authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of
charges and issuance of complaints.., and in respect of the prosecution
of such complaints before the Board, and shall have such other duties
as the Board may prescribe." 79 And, the Board has in fact prescribed
other duties for the General Counsel. The following memorandum of
the Board is self-explanatory: "In order more fully to release the Board
to the expeditious performance of its primary function and responsibility of deciding cases, the full authority and responsibility for all administrative functions of the Agency shall be vested in the General
Counsel. This authority shall be exercised subject to the limitations
... with respect to the personnel of, or directly related to, Board Memers . . . (and) with respect to Regional Directors and Officers-inCharge of Subregional offices .... ,,0

Commenting on the discretion of the General Counsel to either issue
or deny the issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint, the House
Subcommittee on the National Labor Relations Board, after public
hearings, came to the conclusion "that section 10(b) of the act be
amended to provide that the General Counsel shall issue a complaint
whenever he has reason to believe that a violation of the act may have
occurred, and to require the General Counsel to serve on the charging
party a summary report of his reasons for refusing to issue a complaint
whenever he declines to do so." '81 The existing provisions of the National

Labor Relations Act 2 give the "General Counsel the sole and independent responsibility for investigating charges of unfair labor practices,
cases where his investigators find
issuing complaints and prosecuting
8
evidence of violation of the act."
We have noted the significance of the delegation to the regional
84
directors of authority to decide representation cases. Since unfair
discrimination cases. The increase over fiscal 1959 was 48 percent." Twentyfifth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., pp. 4, 5 (1960).

79National Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 3(d), 29 U.S.C. §153(d)

(1958).
Memorandum, effective April 1, 1955, 20 Fed. Reg. 2175 (1955), amended on
August 25, 1958 and May 15, 1961. See, Labor Relations Expediter 4203,
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Wash., D.C.
s1 Report on Administration of National Labor Relations Act by Subcommittee
(Rep. Roman C. Pucinski, Chairman) of House Committee on Education
and Labor, Labor Relations Reporter, Special Supplement, Vol. 48, No. 45,
p. 2, Oct. 2,1961, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Wash., D.C.
82 Supra note 79.
This
83 Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal 1960, 12 (1960).
Report (p. 14) also points out that responsibility for handling court litigation
in which the NLRB is involved is vested in the Division of Litigation of
the Office of General Counsel.
84Supra note 63. Even before the delegation: "The field staff closed 7,632
representation cases during the 1960 fiscal year without the necessity of
formal decision by the Board Members. This comprised 75 percent of the
10,218 representation cases closed by the agency." Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., 12, 13 (1960).
80

JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES

labor practice charges are filed initially in the regional office, 5 the work
of the regional directors, their staffs, and the trial examiners is also
very important in helping the National Labor Relations Board carry
out the objectives of the National Labor Relations Act; for it is here
that such charges receive a preliminary investigation and are quite often
dismissed, settled, or withdrawn. 6 The dismissal of charges, however,
by the regional director is subject to appeal to the General Counsel. 7
The Division of Trial Examiners is responsible for conducting hearings
of unfair labor practice charges after a complaint has been issued. 8
Our rather brief discussion of the organization and functions of the
National Labor Relations Board, and its various divisions, has been for
one purpose-to obtain a sufficient understanding and appreciation of
the general nature and scope of the Board's responsibilities so that we
may discuss more effectively the role of the Board in jurisdictional dispute cases. If the decision concerning the Board's authority to exercise
the power of compulsory arbitration in jurisdictional dispute cases were
to be based on its experience in handling labor relations cases, it is quite
apparent that the Board is exceedingly qualified to perform the task.
For, if this were the only basis upon which to decide the question of the
Board's role in jurisdictional dispute cases, an evaluation of the judicial
function of the Board in gathering and weighing evidence, in determining the proper unit of employees to be represented for collective bargaining purposes, and in deciding whether the existence of certain facts
constitutes an unfair labor practice as defined by statutory law would
compel the conclusion that the National Labor Relations Board is the
appropriate and proper agency to be entrusted with the responsibility
of the power of compulsory arbitration. The United States Supreme
Court evidently had this in mind when it said in the Columbia Broadcasting System case89 that it felt "entirely confident that the Board, with

its many years of experience" could resolve conflicts between sections
of the National Labor Relations Act which the Board said would occur
85 "It is in the regional offices that unfair labor practice charges and repre-

sentation petitions are filed. The regional office staffs . . .make case investigations and conduct representation elections." Twenty-fifth Annual Report
of the N.L.R.B., fiscal 1960, 6 (1960).
86 "Of the 10,309 unfair labor practice cases which the field staff closed (in
fiscal 1960) without formal action, 1,480 ,or 14 percent, were adjusted by
various types of settlements; 3,963, or 39 percent, were administratively dismissed after investigation. In the remaining 4,866 cases, or 47 percent . . .
the charges were withdrawn; in many of these cases, the withdrawals actually
reflected settlement of the matter at issue between the parties." Twenty-fifth
Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., 13 (1960).
87 Supra note 83.
88 During fiscal 1960, trial examiners conducted hearings in 1,474 cases, Twentyfifth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., 15 (1960). See also, in same Report, p.
7, Chart No. 4 on "processing unfair labor practice cases from filing of
charge to close of hearing" and Chart No. 4A on "processing representation
cases."
89 Supra note 1.
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if it were vested with such compulsory authority to settle jurisdictional
disputes. 9°
In our preliminary analysis of the role of the National Labor Relations Board in jurisdictional dispute cases, we have discussed the nature,
scope and background of the jurisdictional dispute and the status of the
Board as an agency of the federal government responsible for the administration and enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act. We
can now proceed with a consideration of the problems involved not only
in the resolution of jurisdictional disputes but in the method by which
they are to be resolved. The initial step is to examine the language of
the federal statutory provisions pertaining to the subject of jurisdictional disputes.
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

We have already observed that the feeling against jurisdictional disputes prior to the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 was rather strong and quite universal. And, as we have seen, the
opposition to union jurisdictional activity became quite vocal in Congress when the proposed legislative regulations dealing with forced
work assignments were discussed. The prevailing attitude was in favor
of the employer who was considered "helpless" and caught in the middle
of a dispute in which he was not the real participant and which he could
not settle without pleasing one side and alienating the other. 91 The result was that in 1947, jurisdictional activity in the forms of strikes or
picketing was declared by subparagraph (D) of section 8(b) (4) of the
Labor Management Relations Act to be an unfair labor practice. Subsection (4) of section 8(b) also declared certain other labor union
92

activity to be unfair labor practices. These include secondary boycotts, 93
union,

forcing a self-employed person or an employer to join a labor
94
forcing an employer to enter into a "hot-cargo" agreement, secondary
95
recognitional activity by uncertified unions, and recognitional picketing after another union has been certified as the collective bargaining
representative for a unit of employees.9"
As originally enacted, section 8(b) (4) was interpreted to apply to
union activity directed against "employees" as defined by the Act for the
90 Supra note 1, at 584.
92 Supra note 37.
92 Originally in subparagraph (A), but by amendment in 1959, in subparagraph
(B), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (B) (1958).
93 Subparagraph (A), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (A) (1958).
94 Ibid. This newly proscribed activity, by an amendment in 1959, prohibits contracts by which an employer agrees not to deal with another person, section
8(e), 29 U.S.C. §158(e) (1958) ; however, this prohibition does not apply to
"the construction industry" nor to a "jobber or manufacturer . . . in the apparel and clothing industry."
95 Subparagraph (B), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (B) (1958).
98 Supra note 25.
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purpose of encouraging a refusal by such employees to perform "their"
services. The United States Supreme Court emphasized that the Act
proscribed union activity which obtained a "concerted" refusal by employees to perform the services of their employment. 97 The Act had
also been interpreted not to apply to union activity directed exclusively
against employers nor against employees of employers who were not
within the meaning of the Act. 98 Congressional reaction to these interpretations came in 1959, with the passage of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act amendments99 to the National Labor Relations Act. Subsection (4) of section 8(b) became clauses (i) and
(ii). Clause (i) now prohibits encouragement of "any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce (to refuse) in the course of his employment to ... perform

any services." 100 This means that labor unions are not permitted, for
the purpose of promoting a jurisdictional dispute or objects proscribed
by subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), to direct any picketing or strike
activity against a single employee even if such an employee does not
come within the term "employee" as defined by section 2(3) of the Act
or is employed by a person not designated as an "employer" by section
2(2) of the Act. Clause (ii) now prohibits such union conduct against
"any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce." This means that picketing for the purpose of obtaining an
assignment of work to win a jurisdictional dispute is an unfair labor
practice even though the picketing was directed exclusively against an
employer and not for the purpose of encouraging his employees to
engage in a strike or refusal to perform services. 0 1
It should be mentioned at this point that the subparagraphs and
subsections of section 8 are divisible according to subject matter or
purpose. Subsection (b) declares union unfair labor practices. Subsection (4) pertains to labor union means or methods, such as strikes or
97 N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Company, 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
98 The Board had held in two cases "that a political subdivision of a State, such

as a county" was not a "person" within the protection of the secondary boycott provision of the federal statute, but was subsequently compelled to reverse this ruling on the basis of Local 25, Teamsters Union v. New York, New
Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 350 U.S. 155 (1956) in which the Supreme
Court had held that a railroad was a "person" within the Act. However, the
Board said the Supreme Court had not ruled "that a railroad or a municipality was also an 'employer' whose employees may not be induced by a
labor organization to engage in a secondary strike." For a discussion of these
cases, see, Twenty-second Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1959,
99-100 (1959).
99 Public Law 86-257, Title VII, 86th Cong., 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§153 (Supp. II, 1961).
100 Italics supplied.
101 The foregoing discussion of the effect and meaning of the 1959 amendments
in clauses (i) and (ii) was based in part upon the Twenty-fifth Annual Report
of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1960, 101 (1960), and upon 44 Labor Relations Reporter 440, September 7, 1959, Vol. 44, No. 37, Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc., Wash., D.C.
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picketing. Subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) pertain to unlawful
ends or objects. Section 8(b) (4) (D), therefore, declares as an unfair
labor practice the means of a strike or picketing to achieve the end of
obtaining an assignment of work which is jurisdictionally in dispute.
This provision of the National Labor Relations Act is such an integral
part of the analysis of the role of the National Labor Relations Board
in the settlement of jurisdictional disputes that no less than the full
inclusion of the text would suffice:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or refusal in
the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, article, materials,
or commodities, or perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is: (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular
work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another
labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such
employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the
Board determining the10bargaining
representative for employees
2
performing such work.
It is interesting to note that although the intent is quite clear that
section 8(b) (4) (D) applies to jurisdictional strikes and picketing, the
terms "jurisdictional" and "dispute" do not appear in the language of
the statute. It should also be emphasized that the Act does not prohibit,
or declare unlawful, the jurisdictional dispute as such-that is, the
actual controversy between two labor unions over the type of work to
be performed by their respective members. But, there is no doubt that
coercive activity of a union to promote the cause of a jurisdictional
dispute is an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (4) (D). A companion provision in the National Labor Relations Act-section 303(a)
(4)10 3-was also enacted by Congress in 1947. In comparing the meaning and scope of these two sections, the United States Supreme Court
observed that: "Section 8(b) (4) (D) and section 303(a) (4) are substantially identical in the conduct condemned. Section 8(b)(4)(D)
gives rise to an administrative finding; section 303(a) (4), to a judg102
103

Section 8(b) (4) (D), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (D) (1958).
Subparagraph (4), as well as subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), was deleted
by a 1959 amendment, leaving section 303(a) as follows: "It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only . . . for any labor organization
to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in

section 8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended." 29
U.S.C. §187(a) (1958).
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1961]

ment for damages."10 4 The Court then notes that the right to recover
damages for a violation of section 303(a) is not "dependent on any
prior administrative determination that an unfair labor practice" exists,
but that "the opposite seems to be true (since) the jurisdictional disputes proscribed by section 303 (a) (4) are rendered unlawful 'for the
purposes of this section only,' thus setting apart for private redress,
acts which might also be subjected to the administrative process."' 0 5
The Supreme Court then concluded that section 303 (b)' 0 6 clearly allows
"the right to sue in the courts" if the union's "presure on the employer
falls in the prescribed category ...

forcing or requiring him to assign

7
particular work" which is declared unlawful in section 303 (a) .10
Let us consider next the procedure designated by Congress in the
National Labor Relations Act to effectuate and enforce the statutory
prohibition against jurisdictional strikes and jurisdictional picketing.
As we have pointed out, section 10(c) of the Act authorizes the National Labor Relations Board to use the most powerful reprimand it can
exact-the issuance of an administrative order against a person violating the Act "to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice."' 08
Since the Board's order is purely administrative, and therefore not of
itself enforceable, section 10(e) of the Act permits the Board to seek
enforcement of its order by petitioning the Circuit Court of Appeals to
lend judicial injunctive sanction to the order if the party against whom
it was issued does not "cease and desist."' 0 9 But, with the inclusion in
the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act of a list of
union unfair labor practices, 1 0 Congress believed that the National
Labor Relations Board should be given additional support to cope with
violations of the Act. Section 10(j) and section 10(L) therefore became a part of the National Labor Relations Act.' 1 In discussing the
need for additional help from the judiciary to aid the administrative
machinery of the Board to operate more effectively, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, during the legislative stage of
these amendments, commented:

Because of the nature of certain of these practices, especially
jurisdictional disputes and secondary boycotts ...

the committee

International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce
Corporation, 342 U.S. 237, 243, 244 (1952).
05 Id. at 244.

104

:0O
29 U.S.C. §187(b) (1958). This section provides: "Whoever shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of any violation of subsection (a) may
sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . and shall recover the damages ... sustained and the cost of suit." See also, supra note 66.
107
Supra note 1, at 244.
08
' Supra note 71.
109 Supra note 74.
110 Section 8(b), subparagraphs (1) through (6), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (1)-(6)
311

(1958).

Supra note 65.
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is convinced that additional procedures must be made available
under the National Labor Relations Act in order adequately to
protect the public welfare which is inextricably involved in labor
disputes.
Time is usually of the essence in these matters, and consequently the relatively slow procedure of Board hearing and
order, followed many months later by an enforcing decree of the
circuit court of appeals falls short of achieving the desired objectives-the prompt elimination of the obstructions to the free flow
and procedure
of commerce and encouragement of the practice
112
of free and private collective bargaining.
According to the provision of section 10(j),11 3 the Board is given
permission to seek and obtain from the appropriate federal district
court a temporary injunction against the continuance of activity which
the Board has officially charged, by issuance of a complaint, as being
an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a) or 8(b). The
purpose of section 10(j) is to prevent an aggravation of damages
pending the hearing by the Board of the case in which the unfair labor
practice is charged. It should be emphasized, however, that the right of
the Board to petition for a temporary injunction under section 10(j) is
permissive, and therefore the Board is not required to seek such injunctive relief pending the hearing of the case.
Congress did not confine its additional enforcement procedure to
the right of the Board under section 10(j) to obtain a temporary cessation of alleged unfair labor practice activity, for section 10(L) also
gives the Board power to obtain judicial restraint against certain unfair
labor practices. The special features of section 10(L), however, are:
(1) that it applies only to charges of union unfair labor practices specified in section 8(b) (4), section 8(e), and section 8(b) (7) ;114 (2) that
"injunctive relief" can be sought if "the officer or regional attorney
.. .has reasonable cause to believe such charges are true and that a
complaint should issue," and (3) that except as to unfair labor practices
caused by jurisdictional disputes, the Board is not merely authorized,
but required, to seek judicial restraint against the continuation of the
alleged unfair labor activity specified in section 10(L) "pending the
15
It is
final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter."'
Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947), 1 Legislative History of
the Labor 'Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 414.
112Supra note 65. Section 10(j) provides that "the Board shall have power,
upon issuance of a complaint . . . charging that any person has engaged in
or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any district court of
the United States . . . for appropriate relief or restraining order. Upon the
filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board
such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper."
114 Section 8(e), supra note 94, and section 8(b) (7), supra note 26, were inserted by amendment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1959.
115Section 10(L), 29 U.S.C. §160(L) (1958) provides that "whenever it is
charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the
112.
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significant, then, that under section 10(L) the Board not only can obtain
the injunction against an alleged unfair labor practice before the Board
has issued, through the General Counsel, a complaint, but is directed to
seek such injunctive relief against violations of those sections of the
Act specified in section 10(L). In discussing section 10(L) during the
legislative process in 1947, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare said that this section "makes it mandatory upon the Board to
petition for injunctive relief in the case of strikes or boycotts that are
alleged to constitute unfair labor practices within the meaning of paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of section 8(b) (4). ' 1' 6 And, as pointed
out above, section 10(L) was amended in 1959, to direct the Board to
seek injunctions against "hot-cargo" activity in violation of section 8(e)
and recognitional picketing in violation of section 8(b) (7). 1 17 It may
be observed, however, that the Board in these situations has not actually
been completely divested of discretionary authority since section 10(L)
requires the Board to obtain injunctive relief as specified therein only
if the Board's regional office is reasonably convinced that the alleged
union unfair labor practice exists. If the Board is so convinced that one
of the unfair labor practices exists against which section 10(L) compels
the Board to seek an injunction, it would not seem an undue interference with the Board's discretion for section 10(L) to compel the Board
to obtain an injunction in such cases.
As we have seen, section 10(L) treats separately the subject of
enjoining union jurisdictional activity in violation of section 8(b) (4)(D). The last sentence of section 10(1) provides that "where such
relief is appropriate (the injunctive) procedure specified herein shall
apply to charges with respect to section 8(b) (4) (D)."21 The Act does
not require, then, that the Board seek judicial restraint against jurisdictional strikes or jurisdictional picketing even if there is "reasonable
cause to believe" that charges of such union activity are true. The
meaning of paragraph (4) (A), (B), or (C) of section 8(b), or section 8(e)
or section 8(b) (7) . . . (and) the officer or regional attorney to whom the
matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true
and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition
any district court of the United States . . . for appropriate injunctive relief
pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter.
Upon the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction
to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems
just and proper ....
In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 8(b)-

(4) (D)."

Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947), 1 Legislative History of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 433.
117 However, a 1959 proviso specifies "such officer or regional attorney shall not
apply for any restraining order under section 8(b) (7) if a charge against
the employer under section 8(a) (2) has been filed and after the preliminary
investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true and
that a complaint should issue."
'116 S.

11s Supra note 115.
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Senate Labor Committee's Report provides the legislative reasoning
behind this provision of section 10(L): "In the case of strikes and
boycotts involving jurisdictional disputes, the same procedure may be
used if appropriate; injunctive relief in such cases is made discretionary
because it is anticipated that the separate machinery provided in section
10(k) for settling such disputes will generally suffice."11 9
We now come to a very important, and probably the most unique,
provision of the National Labor Relations Act in dealing with an unfair
labor practice problem. We have seen that Congress in prohibiting certain picketing and strike objectives chose to include in such prohibition
a union's purpose of promoting its side of a jurdictional dispute. 1 2
But, in doing so, Congress was not exclusively negative in its approach
to the problem of jurisdictional disputes. It sought also to provide in
section 10(k) for the resolution of a jurisdictional dispute which had
been for the cause of the unfair labor practice. Section 10(k) is unique
since it is the only provision in the National Labor Relations Act which
authorizes and directs an administrative hearing and determination of
the controversy involving a charge of an unfair labor practice prior to
the Board's hearing to determine whether a cease and desist order should
issue. As we have just observed, Congress "anticipated that the separate
machinery provided in section 10(k)" would settle the basic jurisdictional dispute which had caused a union to violate section 8(b) (4) (D)
and not necessitate resort to the "injunctive relief" authorized by section 10(L) .121 Has section 10(k) served the objectives "anticipated"
by Congress? The answer to a great extent depends, as does the effectiveness of any statute, upon its interpretation and application by the
agency charged with the responsibility of its administration and enforcement. Before we proceed with the administration of section 10(k)
by the National Labor Relations Board, it is imperative that we review
the language of section 10(k) in its complete context:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of section 8(b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and
determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice
shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such
charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the
Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed
upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon
compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the
Board or upon such voluntary
adjustment of the dispute, such
22
charge shall be dismissed.

119 Supra note 116.
120 Supra note 102.
121 Supra note 119.
122 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 10(k), 29 U.S.C. §160(k)
(1958).
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The questions which section 10(k) pose are, first, what role did
Congress intend for the National Labor Relations Board in the settlement of jurisdictional disputes? And, second, does the language of section 10(k) clearly express this intention? The answers depend on the
analysis of that part of section 10(k) which provides that "the Board
is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of
which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen." The "unfair labor
practice" refers to a strike or picketing to force an assignment of work
declared unlawful by section 8(b) (4) (D). It is also obvious that "the
dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen" is the
jurisdictional dispute between two or more labor organizations competing for the assignment of specific jobs. The prime question, then, concerns the meaning of the words by which "the Board is empowered
and directed to hear and determine" such jurisdictional disputes. Does
the word "directed" mean that the Board is obliged by law "to hear
and determine" these disputes? Does the word "determine" mean that
the Board is required to decide the merits of the dispute between two
labor unions over their right to certain work? Or, does it mean that the
Board need only decide whether the union engaged in the jurisdictional
strike or picketing activity has a legal basis for its claim to the work in
dispute? These are the important questions, and the answers to them
are essential to a determination of the role of the National Labor Relations Board in the settlement of jurisdictional labor disputes.
After the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 became law,
the Board was delegated the initial responsibility of construing the
nature and scope of its own authority "to hear and determine" jurisdictional disputes within the meaning of section 10(k). Since the Board
was the first to answer the questions posed by the wording of section
10(k), it would seem appropriate and necessary to direct our attention
to the early formulation of policy by the Board in the handling of jurisdictional dispute cases under that section of the National Labor Relations Act. Such initial interpretations of its authority by an administrative agency can be important if they determine a course of administration to which the agency subsequently adheres. This was certainly true
of the National Labor Relations Board's policy concerning section
10(k).
THE BOARD's EARLY DECISIONS
INVOLVING SECTION 10 (K)

The uncertainty of the construction to be given the language of
section 10(k) and of the function or role of the National Labor Relations Board in settling jurisdictional disputes thereunder was more than
obvious in the first case involving this section of the Act to come before
the Board. This was the Moore Drydock Company case123 which re123 Local 68, International Association of Machinists, (Moore Drydock Company)
81 N.L.R.B. 1108, 23 L.R.R.M. 1452 (1949).
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suited in a three to two decision with no less than three different viewpoints expressed by the Board members concerning the meaning of
section 10(k). The case involved a dispute between Local 1304, United
Steelworkers, and Lodge 68 of the International Association of Machinists over certain machinist work which had been assigned by the
employer, the Moore Drydock Company, to Local 1304. The dispute
was aggravated by the fact that Local 1304 had been at one time affiliated with the I.A.M. but subsequently became independent and finally
joined the United Steelworkers as Local 1304. The Board took note of
the fact that Local 1304 and the I.A.M. were involved in previous
jurisdictional disputes and that there had been a "pattern of collective
bargaining" between Local 1304 and an employers' group of which the
Moore Drydock Company was a member. Since the I.A.M. was unsuccessful in obtaining the work in dispute, it picketed at the pier where
the Moore Drydock Company was engaged in the repair of a vessel.
Upon filing of a charge that the picketing was for the purpose of forcing an assignment of work "to employees in a particular labor organization . . . rather than to employees in another labor organization," in
violation of section 8(b) (4) (D), the majority of Board members felt
that they were required "under the statute ...to proceed to 'determine
the dispute' pursuant to section 10(k) of the amended Act."'1 24 On the
basis that Local 1304 was the collective bargaining representative of
the machinists employed by the Company and that the I.A.M. had no
members in the Company's employ, the majority determined that the
"I.A.M. (was not) lawfully entitled to force or require Moore Drydock
Company to assign machinists work to their members rather than to
'
members of any other labor organization.1 125
One of the Board members, dissenting in the Moore Drydock case,
found "Sections 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) so obscure . . . the Board is
virtually compelled to resort to the legislative history of these Sections
as a guide to their construction."'1 26 The conclusion reached by this dissenting member of the Board was as follows: "The picketing complained of in this case stemmed from a representation dispute, one
which the Board could have settled conclusively under Section 9 of
the Act if the processes of that Section had been properly invoked and
a genuine question of representation existed. And if, as it would appear,
the I.A.M. picketed the Company's operation to secure illegal discrimination in favor of its members, as well as recognition as the collective
bargaining representative of the Company's machinists, the Company
had recourse under Section 8(b) (2) of the Act.""' 7 The answer of the
124
125

Id. 23 L.R.R.M. 1452, 1453.
Id. at 1457.

126 Supra note 124,

at 1458.

127 Supra note 124, at 1458.

JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES

majority to this line of reasoning was that neither the I.A.M. nor its
local had asserted any claim as to representation, and that "their picketing was not for representation but for the preferential hiring of their
members to the exclusion of the members of Local 1304-conduct which
dovetails peculiarly with the express language defining the unlawful
object in Section 8(b) (4) (D)."128

The second dissenting opinion in the Moore Drydock case expressed
the view that Congress did not intend that sections 8(b) (4) (D) and
10(k) be "coterminous" and that section 10(k) should apply "only to
determine the disputes for which it was originally designed, namely,
those which result from controversies between two labor organizations
competing for the same work.., when the employer occupies a neutral
position and is indifferent as to which of the labor organizations in2 9

1
volved in the controversy performs the work.' 1

It is significant, then, that in the first case to come before the National Labor Relations Board under section 10(k), with five members
on the Board, three views and interpretations of the section resulted.
The majority of three expressed the view that section 10(k) was meant
to apply to the facts of the case since a jurisdictional dispute was involved. The dissenting opinions expressed two different views-one
that the case involved either a representation question or a type of union
discrimination in violation of another section of the Act, other than
section 8(b) (4) (D), and the other that a jurisdictional dispute is not
determinable under section 10(k) if the employer has already assigned
the disputed work to his employees, since he is then not a "neutral"
party. As concerns the question of representation, it would seem that
in the Moore Drydock case, since the employer assigned the work to a
union enjoying representative status and the disputing union was not
the representative of any of the Company's employees, a question of
representation could not exist unless the disputing union petitioned for
an election on the basis that the current bargaining representative had lost
the majority support of the employees and was picketing for the purpose of becoming their bargaining agent. The majority, however, found
that the purpose of the picketing by the disputing union, the LA.M.,
was to replace the current employees represented by the Steelworkers
with members of the I.A.M. It would also seem, in response to the
alternative proposed by the first dissenting opinion, that even if the
conduct of the disputing union was violative of any other section of the
National Labor Relations Act this fact would not necessarily deprive
the Board of its authority to determine a jurisdictional dispute which
the Board has reason to believe caused a violation of section 8(b) (4)
(D). The position of the second dissenting opinion that the Board does
28 Supra note 124, at 1453.
129 Supra note 124, at 1453.
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not have any dispute to determine within the meaning of section 10(k)
when the employer has taken a side in the dispute by assigning the disputed work to his own employees or one of the disputing groups, and
is therefore not "neutral," would mean that most jurisdictional disputes
would not be determinable under section 10(k) since the employer has
usually assigned the disputed work, or caused the dispute by making
the assignment, which motivated the disputing union to strike or picket
in protest. However, the dissenting views in the Moore Drydock case
that section 10(k) was not meant to apply to either "neutral" employers
or representation questions are worthy of consideration and are discussed in subsequent cases.
There was also disagreement in the Moore Drydock case between
the majority and dissenting Board members concerning the type of
"determination" directed by section 10(k). As pointed out, the "determination of dispute" by the majority was merely that the I.A.M. was
not "lawfully entitled to force or require (the employer) to assign
machinists work to their members rather than to members of any other
labor organization."1 30 One of the dissenting members protested: "This
'decision' of the Board has no more effect on the legal position of the
parties than an informal advisory opinion. . . . It serves no purpose
whatsoever. . . . (It is) difficult to believe that Congress actually in-

tended the Board to waste its own time and that of the paries in such
useless procedure."131
In support of his position that the Board should not determine jurisdictional disputes in which the employer has already made a work
assignment, the second dissenting Board member stated that where
"the employer is disposed to favor the employees in a particular labor
organization ...

a determination by the Board unless acceptable to the

employer is highly unlikely to result in industrial peace, for upon his
failure to assign the disputed work in accordance with the Board's decision the strike or boycott would undoubtedly continue, perhaps with
renewed vigor."1' 2 He also concludes that he could not "believe that
Congress actually intended the Board to involve itself in proceedings
so likely to serve no useful purpose."' 33 The majority answers this contention by observing that if the Board were to assume jurisdiction only
over those jurisdictional disputes in which the employer was "neutral"
this would imply that the Board has "discretion to determine to what
situations Section 10(k) applies in face of the mandatory import plainly
implicit (in the language of that section) in the use of the term 'directed' which carries no such connotation." 134 The majority was refer130 Supra note 124, at 1457.

131 Supra note 124, at 1457, 1458.
132 Supra note 124, at 1459.

1 Supra note 124, at 1459.
134 Supra note 124, at 1453.
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ring to the fact that section 10(k) provides that the Board is not only
"empowered" but "directed" to settle jurisdictional disputes. And, in
reply to the dissenting view that the Board's "determination!' was ineffective, the majority states: "This proceeding being under Section
10(k) has as its sole object the 'determination' of the dispute. It is not
an unfair labor practice proceeding at this stage; the Act purposely
postpones that to a subsequent date. It is not a representation proceeding requiring certification of representatives; there is nothing in Section
10(k) which either expressly or by implication requires the Board to
follow the procedure set forth in Section 9. Rather, it is a proceeding
intended for the resolution of disputes arising under Section 8(b) (4)
(D), as the language of Section 10(k) plainly states.... Nor can we
agree . . . that our determination does not specify what the parties
should do about compliance....

(O)ur conclusion ... imposes a clear-

cut obligation, namely, to agree to discontinue picketing in furtherance
135
of the unlawful object proscribed by the Act."'
Discussion of the Moore Drydock case would not be complete if we
did not consider the position of the majority of the Board on the granting of an affirmative award in a jurisdictional dispute determination.
An affirmative award by the Board would mean that the Board would
not just decide if the jurisdictional strike or jurisdictional picketing is
unlawful but would also decide which of the competing unions is entitled to the disputed work on the basis of custom and tradition, the
nature of the work, and the employment history. The majority refused
to make such an affirmative award in the Moore Drydock case and was
careful in pointing out that a determination that the members of the
disputing union-the I.A.M.-were not entitled to the disputed work
was not a determination that the members of the other union-Local
1304 of the Steelworkers-were therefore more properly entitled to the
work. The Board expressed its position on affirmative awards as follows: "It is apparent that any affirmative determination by the Board
now awarding the work to Local 1304 would . . . be tantamount to

awarding it a closed shop or even the lesser forms of security provisions contrary to the prohibition and limitations contained in the Act."' 3
This has been one of the main arguments used consistently by the Board
in support of its refusal to make an affirmative award to one of the
competing unions of the work involved in a jurisdictional dispute. The
substance of the Board's argument, which was used to no avail in the
Columbia BroadcastingSystem case,1 3 7 is that for the Board to decide
that certain disputed work should be assigned to one of the competing
unions would be in violation of the restrictions on union security agree135 Supra note 124, at 1457.
138 Supra note 124, at 1456.
S37Supra note 1.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

ments imposed by section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act.138 The Board's position, therefore, is that to make an affirmative
award of jurisdictionally disputed work would, in effect, be to require
the employer to hire members of a particular union even though the
union does not have a union-shop agreement with the employer. The
result, the Board states, would be that one of the competing unions
could obtain the advantages of a union security agreement by forcing
the Board to make a section 10(k) determination. The Supreme Court's
answer to this rather persuasive argument of the National Labor Relations Board is considered in our subsequent discussion of the Columbia
BroadcastingSystem case.
The Juneau Spruce Corporationcase 139 was the second to come before the Board involving a hearing and determination of a jurisdictional
dispute under section 10(k) of the Act. And, it was the second such
case in which the views of the Board members split three to two. The
employer had obtained a sea-going barge for use in transporting lumber
to the States and Canada and subsequently entered into an agreement
with the International Woodworkers Union covering all of the Company's operations, including barge-loading. The International Longshoremen's Union requested the Company to assign the barge-loading
work to its members and, when the Company refused, picketed the
Company's plant at Juneau. The I.L.U. claimed: (1) it was the
certified representative for longshoremen's work, (2) it had a bargaining contract with the former owner of the plant, (3) the Company had
on occasion used longshoremen for barge work, and (4) it was entitled by custom and tradition to the disputed work. The Board held
that any certification for longshoremen's work the disputing union had
"did not apply to the parties in the present proceeding." 140 In answer
to the second contention of the I.L.U., the Board found that "there
was incontroverted evidence that the Company's purchase agreement
29 U.S.C. 158(a) (3) (1958). This section provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practicefor an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in
this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require
as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth
day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such
agreement, whichever is later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided (in the Act), and (ii) unless following
an election . . . within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees
...have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make
such an agreement ..
" (Italics supplied). By an amendment in 1959, the
above rules pertaining to union-shop agreements were liberalized for employers and employees in the building and construction industry. See, section
8(f), Labor Management and Disclosure Act, supra note 99.
139 Local 16, International Longshoremen's Union, (Juneau Spruce Corporation)
82 N.L.R.B. 650, 23 L.R.R.M. 1597 (1949).
13

140

Id. 23 L.R.R.M. 1597, 1600.
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with the former owner expressly provided that it did not assume the
latter's liabilities, contracts, or labor agreements .... (and) there is no
contention that ...there was any common identity between the purchaser and the seller." The Board also found that when the Company
used longshoremen it was on behalf of its lumber purchasers who requested it and that the customers would then pay the Company for this
labor. The majority then replied to the fourth contention of the I.L.U.:
Inasmuch as we have found that the I.L.U. neither represented
any of the Company's employees nor had any certification, or
contractual or other lawful basis upon which to predicate a right
to the assignment of these particular work tasks, we find it unnecessary to consider the so-called tradition or custom alleged
with respect to such work tasks. It is apparent from the record
that the Company has assigned the work to its own employees.
As we read sections 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k), these sections do
not deprive an employer of the right to assign work to his own
employees; nor were they intended to interfere with an employer's freedom to hire, subject only to the requirement against discrimination as contained in section 8(a) (3) .... In the instant
case, where a union, with no bargaining or any representative
status, made demands on the Company for the assignment of
work to its members to the exclusion of the Company's own employees, the42 question of tradition or custom in the industry is
irrelevant.'
The Board then went on to hold that the I.L.U. was "not lawfully entitled to require the Company to assign the work in dispute to members
of the I.L.U. rather than to employees of the Company who are members of the Woodworkers."
Probably the most significant point made by the majority in the
Juneau Spruce case again concerned the freedom of the employer to
control his own work assignments within the limitations prescribed in
section 8(a) (3)-that the employer cannot discriminate against an
employee either on union or non-union grounds. 44 The Board had consistently adhered to this policy over the years finding that a disputing
union in a jurisdictional work dispute is lawfully entitled to the work
only on the basis of a contract with the employer or on the basis of an
order or certification of the Board. Since its original pronouncement
in the Juneau Spruce case of the freedom of an employer to assign jobs
to employees, the Board had followed this policy in case after case with
little variation in the context of its expression.
The two members of the Board who had dissented in the Moore
Drydock case also dissented in Juneau Spruce. They agreed, however,
-1' Ibid.
142 Supra note 140, at 1600, 1601 (Italics supplied).

34a
Supra note 140, at 1601.

44 Supra note 138.
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that a jurisdictional dispute within the terms of section 8(b) (4) (D)
existed in Juneau Spruce but, on the basis that the employer therein
was not a "neutral" party to such dispute, would have dismissed the
proceeding under section 10(k). The dissenting position was expressed
as follows:
(T)he majority's decision here, which merely rubber stamps the
employer's own prior determination of the issue, is .. .futile.
For the I.L.U. is unlikely to 'comply' with this decision ... until
it is ordered to do so as the result of a proceeding in the unfair
labor practice case. Furthermore, the majority's determination
ignores the purpose of Section 10(k) of the amended Act ...
Congress sought to give the Board the function of arbitrating
jurisdictional disputes .... But to arbitrate a jurisdictional dispute is to determine which of two or more trade or craft groups
of workers, or their respective unions, ought to be assigned to
perform certain disputed work. It is not to decide, as the majority
has done here, the non-arbitrable question as to which of two or
more unions is the chosen representative of the employees who
happen to be performing the disputed work. 145
It is apparent that the majority and dissenting views were in disagreement in the Juneau Spruce case, just as they were in the Moore Drydock case, over two basic issues, namely, the type of jurisdictional dispute which is determinable under section 10(k) and the type of determination section 10(k) directs the Board to make.
The third jurisdictional dispute case to come before the National
Labor Relations Board under section 10(k) was that involving the
Irwin-Lyons Lumber Company.146 The employer converted a ship into
a lumber and oil carrier and hired the crew on an open basis as far as
union affiliation was concerned. But, after the Sailors Union of the
Pacific signed up the ten-member crew, the employer entered into a contract with the S.U.P. as the bargaining representative of the crew.
Thereafter, the employer refused a request by the Cook's Union and
by the Firemen's Union to employ their members as stewards and engine room workers respectively; these unions then picketed the docks
where the vessel was stationed. The Board, emphasizing that the Cook's
and the Firemen's unions had no bargaining or representative status,
held that "the facts in the present case are not distinguishable from
those in the Juneau case, and for the reasons therein stated .... tradi4 7
The
tion and history in the industry are no more relevant here."'
Board in this case, for the first time, was requested to consider the
"voluntary adjustment" provisions of section 10(k). It is important to
recall that section 10(k) provides that a jurisdictional dispute is not to
-5Supra note 140, at 1601, 1602.
146 Union of Marine Cooks and Pacific Coast Firemen's Assn., (Iezuin-Lyons
Lumber Company) 82 N.L.R.B. 916,23 L.R.R.M. 1623 (1949).
147 Id. 23 L.R.R.M. 1623, 1625.

JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES

be determined by the Board if there is "satisfactory evidence" that the
parties have "adjusted or agreed" to adjust their differences. In contesting the right of the members of the Sailors Union to the jobs in
dispute, the Cook's and the Firemen's unions claimed that a "distribution of jurisdiction among the three unions" had been reached "in a
proceeding before the U.S. Maritime Commission." But, the Board
found that "the record is inconclusive as to whether the proposed settlement was actually agreed upon or even acquiesced in by the S.U.P"' 41
Although the two Board members who had dissented in the Mloore
Drydock and Juneau Spruce cases felt obliged to follow those rulings
in the Irwin-Lyons case one of them continued to believe that the majority "approach confuses representation issues with jurisdictional issues" and was "not satisfied that this case involves a true jurisdictional
dispute ...

as it appears that the S.U.P. and the Respondent Unions

are actually rival ...organizations competing for the right to organize
and represent seamen working in stewards' and engine departments,
respectively."'149 The other member of the Board who had dissented in
the two previous cases also disagreed in the Irwin-Lyons case with "the
rejection by the majority of evidence concerning custom and tradition
which would appear to be of primary importance in resolving any real
50
jurisdictional dispute."'
In the fourth case to reach the National Labor Relations Board for
a determination of a jurisdictional dispute-Los Angeles Building
Trades Council-- 51 the charge of a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D)
was brought, not by the employer as in the first three cases, but by one
of the competing unions, the Machinists. Since most of the charges of
union unfair labor practices are brought by the employer, we tend to
forget that the National Labor Relations Act permits anyone detrimentally affected by an unfair labor practice to file such a charge with
the Board.152 The facts in the Los Angeles Trades Council case, however, were similar to those in the preceding cases. The employer, Westinghouse, had employed two machinists to help install a steam turbine
generator at a project where Trades Council members were also employed. When Westinghouse refused the Trades Council's request to
replace the machinists with Millwrights affiliated with the American
148 Ibid.

149 Supra note 147, at 1625, 1626.
150 Supra note 147, at 1626.
151 Los Angeles Building Trades Council, A.F.L., et al., (International Assn.
2

52 of
1n

Machinists) 83 N.L.R.B. 477, 24 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1949).

regard to the filing of all types of unfair labor practice charges involving
employers and labor unions, the Board has reported: "Another alteration of
a trend was noted during fiscal 1960. During the immediately preceding 2
years, for the first time in NLRB history, individuals brought the majority
of the unfair labor charges. In the most recent 12-month period, individuals
filed 47 percent of these charges, unions 40 percent, and employers 13 percent." Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1960, p. 4.
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Federation of Labor, a strike was called of all Trades Council members
on the project. With only the two machinists left on the job, the installation was called off until a settlement was reached. The Board stated
that "none of the contentions here advanced impels us to reach a different conclusion in this case" than that in the Moore Drydock and Juneau
Spruce cases. 153 Again the Board emphasized that the employer "had
no collective bargaining agreement with any labor organization concerning the employees involved." 1 54 The Board evidently felt that if each of
the disputing unions was the bargaining representative for different
groups of employees, the case would then have involved the representational issue of appropriateness of the bargaining unit under section 9
of the Act and not a jurisdictional dispute under section 10(k) and
8(b) (4) (D). The Board also held that Westinghouse was not obligated
to hire members of the disputing Trades Council just because other
employers had employed its members to work on the project. And, in
reply to the Trades Council's claim that the A. F. of L. had determined
the jurisdiction over the jobs in its favor, the Board found that since
Westinghouse was not a party to the award it could not affect the case.
The Board re-affirmed its position in the Los Angeles Trades Council case that a determination under section 10(k) that a disputing union
is "not lawfully entitled to force" the employer to re-assign disputed
work is not an award of the work to members of the union to whom
the employer had already made the assignment since a determination
having such an effect would force the employer to hire only the members of that union contrary to section 8(a) (3) of the Act. In this regard
the Board stated: "In reaching this conclusion we are aware that the
employer in most cases will have resolved, by his employment policy,
the question as to which organization shall be awarded the work. Under
the statute as now drawn, however, we see no way in which we can,
by Board reliance upon such factors as tradition or custom in the industry, overrule his determination in a situation of this particular character." 155 Although the two Board members who had dissented in the
Moore Drydock and Juneau Spruce cases concurred in the determination of this case and agreed "entirely" with the other members "that
the employer in most cases will have resolved, by his employment policy, the question as to which organization shall be awarded the work,"
they nevertheless stated that "for this reason ...

they believe the Board

should eschew the pretense of deciding such matters under Section
10(k) of the Act, in cases like this when the issue is predetermined by
the employer."15 This difference of view, in the early cases, between
153 Supra note 151, 24 L.R.R.M. 1090, 1091.
154Ibid.
155 Supra note 153, at 1091, 1092.
156 Supra note 153, at 1090.
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the majority and dissenting members of the National Labor Relations
Board as to the type of case contemplated by Congress to be within the
Board's jurisdiction under section 10(k) was very significant because
the subsequent volume of jurisdictional disputes to be determined by the
Board would be large or small depending on the view to prevail. For,
if the Board were to follow the minority view of declining jurisdiction
over jurisdictional disputes in which the employer was not "neutral"
because of his assignment of the disputed work to the members of one
of the competing unions, this would, in effect, delegate to employers the
power to decide which jurisdictional disputes were determinable by the
Board under section 10(k). Even if the employer has assigned jurisdictionally disputed work, it would seem better for the Board to possess
the power to determine the jurisdictional question because the employer's assignment could have been in violation of the contractual rights
of the union disputing such an assignment. Although it is true, as the
minority contends, that in most cases the Board would merely approve
the employer's assignment, the Board should nevertheless have the right
to decide if the assignment of disputed work by an employer was an
infringement upon the rights of any other group contesting the legality
of the assignment.
The last case which we are to classify as "early" and the fifth to
come to the National Labor Relations Board for hearing and determination was that involving the Ship Scaling Contractors' Association.157
This case is significant for several reasons. It was the first case in which
the Board quashed the notice of hearing under section 10(k). It represented a clear manifestation of the dependence of the Board's jurisdiction "to hear and determine" jurisdictional disputes under section 10 (k)
upon the interpretation of the language of section 8(b) (4) (D). And,
the case had a procedural effect which is to be discussed in more detail
in the topic to follow.
The Ship Scaling case involved picketing by the Painters Union,
Local 961, at piers where two ships were being painted by contractors
who employed members of the Longshoremen's Union. The complaint
of the Painters Union was that the agreement between these contractors
and the I.L.U. authorized the payment of wages below that paid by contractors hiring members of the Painters Union. In emphasizing that
"the Board's power to determine a dispute under section 10(k) is limited by the terms of section 8(b) (4) (D)," the Board held that the facts
did "not present a dispute over the assignment of work" within that
section of the Act since the Painters Union resorted "to picketing as a
means of publicizing the existence of the wage differential and to exert
pressure upon the offending contractors to adjust their wage scale up157 Local 961. Ship Painters Union, A.F.L., (Ship Scaling Contractors Assn.)
87 N.L.R.B. 92, 25 L.R.R.M. 1086 (1949).
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ward to meet the prevailing rate" of the Painters Union. 15 8 The Board
based its finding on evidence which showed that (1) "the pamphlets
distributed by the pickets ...

described the controversy as a wage dis-

pute," (2) there had been no "demand upon any employer that he
assign" any work to the Painters Union, and (3) a union representative
had said that he "didn't care who got the work, so long as the prevailing scale of wages was being paid."' 159 In concluding "that the dispute
in this case is one over differing wage scales between AFL and CIO
unions, and not one over the assignment of work,"1 0 the Board performed a primary administrative function intrinsically "judicial" in
character, namely, its discretion in weighing evidence. For, by its determination of the facts in the Ship Scaling case, the Board not only
settled two questions of law-the applicability of sections 8(b) (4) (D)
and 10(k)-but also effectively demonstrated the importance of the dependency of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
under section 10(k) upon the existence of a probable violation of section 8(b) (4) (D). The Board made it clear that a preliminary decision
on the merits of a substantive issue-the violation of section 8(b) (4)
(D)-was prerequisite to a decision of a procedural issue, namely, the
exercise by the Board of its jurisdiction to determine a jurisdictional
dispute under section 10(k).
These five early cases dealing with the applicability of section 10(k),
and therefore section 8(b) (4) (D) as well, serve to give us an idea of
the type of factual controversy involved in jurisdictional disputes and
also indicate the problems of statutory interpretation which would beset the National Labor Relations Board in the many jurisdictional dispute cases to follow. But, before we proceed with an analysis of these
later cases that further develop the federal statutory law of jurisdictional disputes, it is appropriate at this time to consider the statements of
policy, rules, and procedure which the Board has formulated to guide
its administration of the statutory provisions pertaining to jurisdictional
disputes.
ADmINISTRATIVE POLICY IN JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE CASES

The procedural policy followed by the National Labor Relations
Board in the application and administration of section 10(k) has been
developed through its own decisions and through the Board's promulgation of rules and regulations. The Board has also found occasion to
clarify administrative policy in its annual reports. However, the primary source of procedural policy which governs Board proceedings
158 Id. 25 L.R.R.M. 1086, 1088.
L59
Ibid.
16o Supra note

158.
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under section 10(k) as well as other sections of the National Labor
Relations Act is the rules and regulations and statements of procedure
"enacted" by the Board under its quasi-legislative
power as an administrative agency of the federal government. Although the Board need not
defend its right to promulgate such rules and regulations since it has
been specifically authorized by Congress "to make, amend, and rescind"
them,161 the Board has referred1 62 to an opinion of the Court of Appeals
for the fifth circuit which supported the Board's power to regulate the
exercise of its jurisdiction "either in the form of an individual decision
or as rule making for the future, in any manner reasonably calculated
163
to carry out its statutory duties."
According to the Board's Rules and Regulations, 6 4 the regional
director "shall investigate" the charge of a violation of section 8(b) (4)
(D) "and if it is deemed appropriate to seek injunctive relief of a district court pursuant to section 10(L) of the act. . ."65 The Rules then
state that if the regional director believes "that the charge has merit"
and the parties have neither adjusted nor agreed to adjust the dispute,
"he shall cause to be served on all parties to such dispute a notice of
hearing under section 10(k) of the act before a hearing officer.... The
notice of hearing shall contain a simple statement of the issues involved
in such dispute .... Upon the close of the hearing, the proceeding shall
be transferred to the Board and the Board shall proceed either forthwith
upon the record, or after oral argument, or the submission of briefs, or
further hearing, to determine the dispute or make disposition of the
66
matter."
The National Labor Relations Board has recently amended its rules
for the purpose of expediting the handling of cases under section
10(k).167 Each regional director is now required "as soon as possible
61
1
182

Supra note 54.
Twenty-first Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., for fiscal year 1956, 126 (1956).
363 Optical Workers Union, Local 24859 v. N.L.R.B., 227 F. 2d 687, 691 (5th
Cir. 1955), reltearing denied, 229 F. 2d 170 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. dentied,
351 U.S. 963 (1956). The Circuit Court in this case found authority for its
decision in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 332

64

1
165

166

U.S. 194 (1947).
Supra note 54.

N.L.R.B. Rules, section 102.89.
N.L.R.B. Rules, section 102.90. According to a memorandum of the Board,
suptra note 80: "The General Counsel of the Board is authorized and has
responsibility, on behalf of the Board, to perform all functions necessary

to the accomplishment of the provisions of Section 10(k) of the Act, but in
connection therewith the Board will, at the request of the General Counsel,
assign to him for the purpose of conducting the hearing provided for therein,
one of its staff Trial Examiners. This authority and responsibility and the

assignment of the Trial Examiner to the General Counsel shall terminate
with the close of the hearings. Thereafter the Board will assume full juris167

diction over the matter for the purpose of deciding the issues in such hearing
on the record made and subsequent hearings or related proceedings and will
also rule upon any appeals."

Rules amended were sections 102.89 and 102.90 on August 15, 1961.
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after the charge" of a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) " has been filed,
(to) serve upon the parties" to a jurisdictional dispute "a copy of the
charge together with a notice of the filing of the charge."' 168 The Rules
now also allow the proceeding before the hearing officer to begin "ten
days after service of the notice of the filing of said charge.'

69

For-

merly, the 10(k) hearing could not be held until ten days after the service of the notice of hearing. Presumably, the amendment was for the
purpose of conducting hearings in jurisdictional dispute cases at an
earlier date than was permitted under the old rule. This would certainly
be its effect if the old rules allowed the notice of hearing to be served
after the notice of the filing of the charge. Undoubtedly this was so in
practice. To be sure section 102.90 of the Board's Rules provided, and
continues to provide, that the notice of hearing, "in cases in which it is
deemed appropriate to seek injunctive relief pursuant to section 10(L)
of the act, shall normally be issued within 5 days of the date upon which
injunctive relief is first sought." This would indicate that the notice of
hearing can be served after the notice of the filing of the 8(b) (4) (D)
charge. However, prior to its amendment, section 102.90 provided that
the regional director "shall cause to be served on all parties" to a jurisdictional dispute the "notice of the filing of said charge together with a
notice of hearing" 170 which would seem to require that the two notices
be served on the parties at the same time. If this is a fair interpretation
of the phrase "together with," it would be correct to conclude that the
language of the old rule could have been construed to achieve the purpose of the amendment since a hearing ten days after the notice of hearing would also be ten days after the notice of the filing of the 8(b) (4)
(D) charge.
In an effort to expedite the hearing of jurisdictional disputes which
affect the national defense program, the National Labor Relations Board
has included in its recent rule amendments the provision that in such
cases "no briefs shall be filed, and the parties, after the close of the
evidence, may argue orally upon the record their respective contentions
and positions: Provided further, That in cases involving the national
defense, upon application for leave to file briefs expeditiously made to
the Board in Washington, D.C., after the close of the hearing, the Board
may for good cause shown grant such leave and thereupon specify the
time for filing.' 17 ' This new rule concerning the filing of briefs is appliRules, section 102.89; similarly amended was section 101.31 of the
Board's Statements of Procedure, see, supra note 56.
169 N.L.R.B. Rules, section 102.90; similarly amended was section 101.33 of the
Board's Statements of Procedure. Section 101.33 also now provides "that in
cases involving national defense, agreement will be sought for scheduling of
hearing on less notice."
170 Italics supplied.
171 N.L.R.B. Rules, section 102.90; similarly amended was section 101.35 of the
Board's Statements of Procedure. Additional procedure has also been re168N.L.R.B.
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cable only to jurisdictional disputes "involving the national defense and
so designated in the notice of hearing" and does not affect the existing
rule which permits parties in all other jurisdictional dispute cases if
they so "desire to file a brief with the Board ...at Washington, D.C.,
within 7 days after the close of the hearing."''
In its Statements of Procedure,1 7 3 the National Labor Relations
Board points out that the filing of an 8(b) (4) (D) charge is necessary
to initiate the investigatory action by the Board concerning a jurisdictional dispute,17 4 that the regional director has discretion in determining whether a dispute should be determined under section 10(k) ,17 and
that if a hearing is held thereunder "it is non-adversary in character"
to be conducted by a "hearing officer" whose "primary interest" is to
obtain all "pertinent facts" to be "transmitted" by him to the Board
with his "analysis of the issues and the evidence" but with "no recommendations in regard to the resolution of the dispute."17 Finally, the
Board "considers the evidence and the hearing officer's analysis ...and
77
issues its determination or makes other disposition of the matter."'
We have mentioned that the National Labor Relations Board has
found occasion to express and develop administrative policy in its case
decisions, and Board policy concerning the applicability of section 10 (k)
has been no exception to such origin and method of declaration. In our
discussion of the early jurisdictional dispute cases, it was pointed out
that the Ship Scaling case17 was significant procedurally as well as subcently devised to help settle labor disputes affecting national security. A spe-

cial Missile Sites Labor Commission, composed of the Secretary of Labor,
as Chairman, and representatives of the public, labor, and industry, has been
created "by executive order

(No. 10946)

to develop 'policies, procedures,

and methods of adjustment for labor programs at missile and space sites....
Existing voluntary dispute-adjustment machinery will be used, where effective. This could include the National Joint Board for the Settlement of

Jurisdictional Disputes established by the building trade unions and em-

ployers, the procedure under no-raid pacts of the AFL-CIO and its Industrial Department, and the program still to be worked out by (the) AFLCIO for handling disputes between construction and industrial unions ...
Disputes not disposed of by these procedures will be handled by special

panels, composed of Commission members or others named by (the Secretary of Labor)

....

In theory, the recommendations of the Commission and

its panels will not be binding. But (The Secretary of Labor) believes their
acceptance is guaranteed by the pledges from all groups involved." 48 Labor
Relations Reporter 151, June 5, 1961, Vol. 48, No. 11. Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc., Wash., D.C. In regard to this new method of resolving labor
disputes affecting national security, the N.L.R.B. has stated: "The establishment of the Missile Sites Labor Commission did not, and indeed could
not, divest the Board of its statutory jurisdiction and duties as defined by
the Act." Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co. and Local 611, I.B.E.W.,
Case No. 28-RC-889, 48 L.R.R.M. 1511 (1961).
172 N.L.R.B. Rules, section 102.90 and Statements of Procedure, section 101.35.
173 Supra notes 54, 55, and 56.
174 Section 101.31.
175 Section 101.33.
176 Section 101.34.
177
178

Board's Statements of Procedure, section 101.35.
Supra note 157.
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stantively. A contention in that case was that the Board had no jurisdiction under section 10(k) to determine a jurisdictional dispute unless
the Board found that an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice had in fact
occurred. The Board replied: "We find no merit in this contention. All
that is required to invoke the Board's jurisdiction to hear and determine
a dispute within the meaning of section 10(k) is the filing of a charge
alleging a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D), and an investigation, pursuant to the Board's Rules and Regulations, which satisfies the Board's
Regional Director that there is reasonable cause to believe that section
8(b) (4) (D) has been violated.'

179

The Board is, of course, correct

when it states that an actual finding that section 8(b) (4) (D) has been
violated is not necessary to proceed under section 10(k) since it was
not the intention of section 10(k) either to declare jurisdictional union
activity to be an unfair labor practice or to authorize the hearing of
such an unfair labor practice thereunder. It is section 8(b) (4) (D)
which declares union activity to force an assignment of jurisdictionally
disputed work to be an unfair labor practice, and it is under sections
10(b) and 10(c) that the Board hears and determines the existence of
such an unfair labor practice. On the other hand, the language of section 10(k) is quite clear in providing that "the Board is empowered
and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair
labor practice shall have arisen." The language of section 10(k) is
equally clear that the basic jurisdictional dispute is to be heard and determined by the Board "whenever it is charged that any person has
engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph
(4) (D) of section 8(b)." 8 °
The difficulty, however, with that part of the language of section
10(k) upon which the Board's jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional
disputes depends is not clarity but practicality, for a literal construction
of the phrase "whenever it is charged" leads to an unrealistic conclusion. This was brought out in a case in which the Board's administrative
rule that no 10(k) hearing of a jurisdictional dispute would be conducted unless the regional director's preliminary investigation revealed
"that the charge has merit" was judicially contested. The case was
Herzog v. Parsons."'l The issue in this case was a reversal of the contention that had been made in the Board's Ship Scaling case. In Herzog
v. Parsons,the contention was not that the Board is required to decide
the validity of the 8(b) (4) (D) charge before it could exercise its jurisdiction under section 10(k) but that the Board had no right to make
even a preliminary investigation of the reasonableness of the charge of
an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice as a prerequisite to its hearing and
179 Id. at 1088.
180 Italics supplied.
isi 181 F. 2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
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determination of the basic jurisdictional dispute which gave rise to the
charge. It was argued that the Board had no discretion in deciding
whether to conduct a hearing under section 10(k) by questioning the
merits of the charge of an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (4)
(D) since, once an 8(b) (4) (D) charge has been filed, the Board is
obliged under section 10(k) to proceed with a determination of the
jurisdictional dispute which precipitated the union conduct causing the
charge. The uncertainty of the construction to be given the language of
section 10(k) pertaining to this question was evident by the fact that
the Circuit Court, in upholding the Board's position, reversed the District Court which had ordered the Board to proceed with a hearing
and determination under 10(k) without the aid of a preliminary investigation of the grounds for the 8(b) (4) (D) charge which had initiated the 10(k) proceeding. As further evidence of this uncertainty, the
Circuit Court replied as follows to the appellee's claim that section
10(k) clearly required a Board hearing and determination only upon
the charge of an 8(b) (4) (D) violation. "In the first place, we have a
great deal more difficulty in finding the language of 10(k) as clear and
unambiguous as does the appellee ....

A mere charge of an 8(b) (4)

(D) violation does not, ipso facto, operate to give verity to the existence
of such unfair labor practice. Thus before the Board may proceed to a
hearing it must determine whether in fact the dispute does give rise to
the 8(b) (4) (D) violation, and, in order to make this determination, it
conmust conduct a preliminary investigation. This is the only rational
1 2
struction that can be made of the language of 10(k) itself."
Finding support for its reasoning in other sections of the National
Labor Relations Act, the Circuit Court in Herzog v. Parsonsnoted that
section 10(L), particularly, requires a "preliminary investigation" and
observed:
Under these circumstances it would be ridiculous to suppose that
Congress intended on the one hand that the Board or its agents
make a preliminary investigation under 10(L), while on the
other hand command the Board to hear and determine the case
even though the preliminary investigation revealed insufficient
probable cause. We cannot subscribe to a construction of the
statute which would lead to such irrational results. ... We think

Congress intended to have 10(k) proceedings dovetail with the
rest of section 10 in order that the applicable machinery of the
other subsections might be more easily implemented if and when
necessary .... A preliminary investigation is always permitted in

these other proceedings where an 8(b) (4) (D) violation is concerned, and we must conclude, in light of reason and of the fact
that nowhere in the Act is that right expressly excluded in a
10(k) action, that it was intended that such investigations be permitted ....
382

Id. at 784.

Section 11 also refers directly to this investigatory
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power. It authorizes the Board to issue subpoenas to compel the
production of documents and the presence of witnesses. . . 'which
in the opinion of the Board, are necessary and proper for the
exercise of the powers vested in it by section 9 and section 10." 1
The Circuit Court concludes that if section 10(k) were to be construed
to prohibit the conduct of a preliminary investigation to determine the
validity of the initial unfair labor practice charge "(t)he administrative
proceedings of the Board would be hampered by the necessity of proceeding to a hearing on even the most frivolous of charges alleging an
18
8(b) (4) (D) violation."'
Despite the logic and practicality of the Court's reasoning in Herzog
v. Parsons,there is nevertheless a real dilemma in resolving the problem of the validity of a preliminary investigation under section 10(k)
since to pursue the correct reasoning that the purpose of section 10(k)
is to hear and determine the jurisdictional dispute giving rise to the
charge of an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice, and not to hear the
charge itself, would support the contention that the Board is compelled
by the language of section 10(k) to hear the jurisdictional dispute
merely upon the filing of an 8(b) (4) (D) charge without any preliminary investigation concerning the validity of the charge. It is quite
persuasive to argue that if the Board does not hear unfair labor practice charges under section 10(k) then it is equally prohibited from doing this indirectly by determining, even in a preliminary and investigatory way, the "merits" or "reasonable cause" of such a charge. On the
other side of the dilemma, practical necessity demands that such a preliminary investigation be made to effectuate the very purpose of section
10(k) ; for if the Board did not have the discretion to pre-determine
the validity of the charge of an 8(b) (4) (D) violation, the Board would
then be compelled in certain cases to hear and determine jurisdictional
s
disputes which do not involve an unfair labor practice. This was not
the intention of section 10(k). The Board, and not the charging party,
should have the power to decide if a jurisdictional dispute is determinable under section 10(k), otherwise the Board, as the Circuit Court in
Herzog v. Parsonsstates, would be confronted with "the most frivolous
of charges."' 86
Although the annual reports of the National Labor Relations Board
are not a part of federal administrative labor law, in the sense that the
Board's rules and regulations and decisions are so recognized, nevertheless these reports are a rich source of information concerning the views
183

Id. at 786, 787.

Id. at 787.
285 It should be recalled that neither section 8(b) (4) (D) nor section 10(k)
prohibit jurisdictional disputes as such. See, supra notes 102, 122.
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1so Supra note 184.
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as well as the activities of the Board.18 7 The Board's first opportunity,
after its initial year of experience in administering the provisions of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, to summarize its views concerning the nature and scope of jurisdictional dispute proceedings under
section 10(k) came with the publication of the Board's Fourteenth
Annual Report. 88 The Board made the following observation therein:
Section 10(k), as its language indicates, prescribes a preliminary proceeding for the resolution of so-called jurisdictional disputes which are complained of under section 8(b) (4) (D). A
proceeding under section 10(k) is nonadversary in character.
Designed to facilitate the settlement of jurisdictional disputes, it
merely results in a 'determination' of the dispute, and not in an
order enjoining unfair labor practices or directing affirmative action. Only if and when the parties thereafter fail to comply with
the Board's determination of the dispute, may a complaint issue
upon the charge under section 8(b) (4) (D) ;is' the case may
thereupon be processed to completion like any other unfair labor
practice proceeding. In that event, the record and the Board's
determination in the section 10(k) proceeding become a part of
the record in the unfair labor practice proceeding. 190
After its second fiscal year of experience in hearing unfair labor
practice cases under section 8(b) (4), the National Labor Relations
Board compared the proceedings under subparagraph (D) with those
under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of that section:
A charge of unfair labor practice under this section, however,
must be handled in a different manner from that for handling
any other type of unfair labor practice charge ....

This is pro-

vided by section 10(k), which requires that the parties be given
a 10-day period to adjust their disputes. If, at the end of this
time, they are unable to 'submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they adjusted or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of the dispute,' the Board then is empowered to
make a determination in the case. Section 10(k) further provides
that 'upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the deci187 Section 3(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §153(c) (1958),

provides: "The Board shall at the close of each fiscal year make a report in
writing to Congress and to the President stating in detail the cases it has
heard, the decisions it has rendered, the names, salaries, and duties of all
employees and officers in the employ or under the supervision of the Board,
and an account of all moneys it has disbursed."
288 For the fiscal year 1949, U.S. Govt. Printing Office (1950).
189 The Board has subsequently held that an 8(b) (4) (D) proceeding could be
held "without the prerequisite of a hearing and determination under section
10(k) of the Act, if it appears that there exists an agreed upon method of
voluntary adjustment which has broken down in settling an underlying jurisdictional dispute." Local 2, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Acoustical ContractorsAssn. of Cleveland) 119 N.L.R.B. 1345, 41 L.R.R.M. 1293, 1297 (1958).
190 Supra note 188, at 99. (Italics supplied).
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sion of the Board, or upon such voluntary adjustment of the
dispute, such charge shall be dismissed. ' 191
In its next annual report, the Board elaborated on the method of its
handling of jurisdictional dispute cases as follows:
Where a charge under section 8(b)(4)(D) has been filed
and the statutory 10-day period has expired without adjustment,
the Board will determine whether the alleged dispute is properly
before it. The Board has administratively adopted the rule that a
dispute will be determined under section 10(k) only upon a
showing that there is 'reasonable cause to believe' that section
8(b) (4) (D) has been violated .... 192
An examination of these quotations from successive annual Board
reports reveals three important and distinct pronouncements concerning the meaning and applicability of section 10(k). The significant feature of the Board's comments in the Fourteenth Annual Report concern
the nature of the proceeding under section 10(k)-that such a proceeding is "preliminary" and "nonadversary" and that the 10(k) hearing "merely results in a 'determination' of the dispute, and not in an
order enjoining unfair labor practices or directing affirmative action."
In its Fifteenth Annual Report, the Board emphasizes that the parties
to a jurisdictional dispute have the initial right to settle it themselves
without interference by the National Labor Relations Board and that
this is one of the important differences in handling an unfair labor
practice charge involving a jurisdictional dispute and other unfair labor
practice charges. Then, in its Sixteenth Annual Report, the Board
stresses the dependency of its jurisdiction to hear and determine jurisdictional disputes under section 10(k) upon a finding that there is
reason to believe that the union charged with forcing a work assignment
has in fact violated section 8(b) (4) (D). It should be noted that in
each of these annual statements, the Board was concerned with the extent of its jurisdiction in hearing and determining jurisdictional disputes under section 10(k).
In support of its contention that the 10(k) proceeding is "nonadversary in character," the Board in its Fourteenth Annual Report, supra,
cites the Irwin-Lyons Lumber Company case °3 as authority for the
conclusion that section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act 94 does
not apply to National Labor Relations Board hearing under section
191 Fifteenth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1950, 149 (1950), (Italics
supplied). See also, Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal
year 1960, 111 (1960).
192 Sixteenth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1951, 230 (1951).
(Italics supplied).
19 Supra note 146,
194 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §1007 (1958).
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10(k).19' Section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act pertains to
"Decisions" of the various administrative agencies of the federal government and provides that such administrative decisions must include
a statement of "findings and conclusions" as well as "the appropriate
rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof." In fact the Board has
also said that "since a 10(k) hearing is conducted like a representation
hearing and is of an investigatory nature, the Board does not resolve
conflicts in testimony."196 The Board did not, therefore, prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in the Columbia Broadcasting System case,
consider the results of its deliberations under section 10(k) to be
effective in a compulsory manner since the Board viewed the character
of its function and its determination under section 10(k) as preliminary, advisory, and unenforceable.
It is interesting to examine that view that the proceeding under section 10(k) is "nonadversary in character." The initial question with
which the Board is confronted in jurisdiction dispute cases concerns its
own jurisdiction to hear the case under section 10(k). The two basic
issues upon which depend the Board's authority to hear and determine
jurisdictional disputes under section 10(k) are: (1) whether there is
reason to believe that an unfair labor practice has occurred in violation
of section 8(b) (4) (D), and (2) whether the parties to the jurisdictional dispute have either agreed upon a method of private settlement
or have actually adjusted the dispute. It is true that the finding of
"reasonable cause" of an 8(b) (4) (D) violation is made initially by
the regional director, but such a finding is made in the name of the
National Labor Relations Board and should the Board disagree with
the finding the Board would quash the notice of a 10(k) hearing. Of
course, if the Board answers the first question in the negative, the second question need not be considered. The problem of the Board's jurisdiction under section 10(k), therefore, is a complication of questions
of procedural and substantive law since the procedural question of the
Board's jurisdiction under section 10(k) depends upon an examination
of the merits of the jurisdictional strike or picketing charge.
The first jurisdictional issue demands that the Board, in determining the reasonableness of the basic charge that section 8(b) (4) (D) has
been violated, consider the substance or merits of the charge that cerIn its Fourteenth Annual Report, supra note 188, at 99, footnote 68, the
Board cites the Irwin-Lyons case as holding "that section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to a proceeding under section 10(k), because (such) a hearing was nonadversary in character and the decision
rendered therein was merely 'preliminary administrative determination made
for the purpose of attempting to resolve a dispute within the meaning of
that section.'
196Local 472, International Laborers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Ernest Renda
Contracting Co.) 123 N.L.R.B. 1776, 44 L.R.R.M. 1263, 1238 (1959). citing
therein, Local 90. I.B.E.W., A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Southern New England Telephone
Co.) 121 N.L.R.B. 1061, 42 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1958).
95
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tain union activity against an employer was actually for the purpose
of forcing him to assign or re-assign jurisdictionally disputed work.
The Ship Scaling case1 97 is an excellent example of this principle. To
recall a basic fact in that case, a Contractor's Association had charged
the Painters Union with a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) and sought
a hearing and determination of what the Association considered to be
a jurisdictional dispute between the Painters Union and the Longshoremen's Union. It should also be recalled that the Board pointed out that
a determination of a jurisdictional dispute under section 10(k) depends
upon whether "there was reasonable cause to believe" that the union
charged with an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice had violated that
section of the Act. 198 In refusing to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that the dispute between the two unions was over a wage differential
and not an assignment of work, the Board had to "weigh" the evidence.
Yet, since the Board quashed the notice of hearing under section 10(k),
it could be said there was no 10(k) proceeding. But, wasn't there a
hearing in fact? Did not the Board listen to two sides of an issue? Did
it not make a choice as to which side was correct? Consider again the
Board's finding in the Ship Scaling case that the facts therein did not
reasonably support the charge that section 8(b) (4) (D) had been violated. This finding was certainly adverse to the interests of the party
seeking a determination of a dispute under section 10(k) since the
finding caused the Board to quash the notice of a 10(k) hearing. On the
other hand, the union whose picketing precipitated the charge of an
8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice was undoubtedly pleased to hear that
the Board did not consider such a charge to be reasonable. Did the
National Labor Relations Board make a decision under section 10(k) ?
It would be very difficult indeed to explain to the party who sought,
and did not get, the 10(k) determination that the hearing was merely
investigatory and that the case was not lost since no decision had been
made. If such a party wished to proceed with the unfair labor practice
charge, would the Board through its General Counsel issue a complaint
under section 10(b) of the Act if no new evidence was presented?
Certainly, the Board's finding of "no reasonable cause" would be determinative in such a case.
Suppose, however, the National Labor Relations Board decides, as
it did in the four cases prior to the Ship Scaling case, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge of an 8(b) (4) (D) violation is
valid. Can it be argued that the Board's finding of "reasonable cause"
was really investigatory, undecisive, and separable from an actual holding that the Board had reason to believe section 8(b) (4) (D) had in
fact been violated? It is true, of course, that the standard of proof nec-

Supra note 157.
198 Supra note 179.
197
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essary to support a finding of reasonable belief that the National Labor
Relations Act has been violated is less demanding than the type of
proof required to support the finding of an actual violation. The Board
has said that the difference in the types of proof is that a finding of
"reasonable cause" under section 10(k) need not be "based on a preponderance of the evidence" as does a finding in an unfair labor practice proceeding. 1 9 "In view of (these) different standards of proof,"
the Board has refused to "adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusion that
the Board's findings and conclusions in the Section 10(k) proceeding
'
are binding in the subsequent 8(b) (4) (D) proceeding.

20 0

The Board

has also said that the purpose of section 10(k) "is not directed to deciding definitely whether the record would sustain a complaint alleging
8(b) (4) (D) violations.

' 20 1

Does this mean that if the same evidence

is later presented to the Board in an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice
hearing under section 10(c) of the Act the Board's hearing and decision
to issue or not to issue a cease and desist order would be independent
of the previous 10(k) proceeding? On the contrary, "the record of the
proceeding under section 10(k) and the determination of the Board
thereon . .. become a part of the record in such unfair labor practice
proceeding." 20 2 In fact, the Board in commenting on four cases in which
violations of section 8(b) (4) (D) were found stated that the unions
had relied "for the most part on matters that had been determined 20in3
the earlier 10(k) proceeding and were not subject to relitigation."
This would certainly indicate that the Board's findings in a 10(k) hearing are more than investigatory and are quite decisive.
It would also seem that if a 10(k) determination is based only on
"reasonable proof" the Board would be compelled in the unfair labor
practice hearing to require additional evidence upon which to base an
order that a union cease and desist from engaging in jurisdictional
activity prohibited by section 8(b) (4) (D). The additional evidence in
the unfair labor practice hearing would appear to be necessary to supply the "preponderance" of proof which the Board states is not necessary to hear and determine a jurisdictional dispute under section 10(k).
Does the Board in practice make these additional findings of fact in
the unfair labor practice hearing? What are the chances, following such
a hearing and without any agreement to settle by the parties, that the
Board would refuse to issue a cease and desist order after it has made
a previous determination under section 10(k) that a disputing union in
International Typographical Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Worcester Telegram
Publishing Co.) 125 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 45 L.R.R.M. 1184, 1185, n. 5 (1959).
200 Id. 45 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
201 Twenty-second Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1957, 109 (1957),
citing Local 675, International Union of Operating Engineers, A.F.L.-C.I.O.,
(Port Everglades Terminal Co.) 116 N.L.R.B. 27, 35 (1956).
202 N.L.R.B. Rules, section 102.92, series 8, supra note 54.
203 Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1959, 112 (1959).
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the case was not lawfully entitled to force an employer to assign work
to its members rather than to members comprising some other class or
group? If the Board has ever found that the evidence in an 8(b) (4) (D)
unfair labor practice hearing was insufficient to support the finding of
an 8(b) (4) (D) violation after the Board had previously found in a
10(k) hearing reasonable cause to believe there was such a violation,
such a case is difficult to find. In fact, although it has never specifically
so held, the Board in an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice proceeding
seems to find as a matter of course that noncompliance with its 10(k)
determination is ground for issuance of a cease and desist order. The
Board has, however, specifically stated that an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair
labor practice "complaint issues if the party charged fails to comply
with the Board's determination." 20 4 Thus, despite the difference between "reasonable" and "preponderant" proof, it would be incongruous
to hold that no decision concerning the violation of section 8(b) (4) (D)
has been made in a 10(k) proceeding simply because the finding of
such violation was based on "reasonable" evidence and not a "preponderance" of evidence. Certainly, the conclusion that the Board reasonably believes there is a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) qualifies as a
"decision" upon which the Board's authority to determine the basic
jurisdictional dispute is based. We are forced to observe that the
strength or basis of a decision does not detract necessarily from its
effect as a decision. We are, therefore, compelled to conclude that the
initial question of the Board's jurisdiction under section 10(k)-reasonableness of the charge that a union has violated section 8(b) (4) (D)
-necessarily involves adverse parties whose interests are differently
affected by the Board's decision either to hear and determine a jurisdictional dispute or to quash the notice of such a hearing.
Let us proceed to a consideration of the second issue upon which
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board depends. According to the instruction of section 10(k), even if there is reason for the
Board to believe that a union has performed an unfair labor practice in
promoting its side of a jurisdictional dispute, the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction to hear and determine such dispute in competition with
the right of the parties to settle it themselves. This is the reason the
Board has stated frequently in its annual reports that the charge of an
8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice "must be handled differently from
20 5
The lancharges alleging any other type of unfair labor practice."
guage of section 10(k) specifically provides that the parties to a jurisdictional dispute have the right to submit to the Board "within ten days
after notitce that such charge has been filed ...satisfactory evidence
Id. at 108.
205 Supra note 191. The Board has made this statement in each of its annual
reports, from the Fifteenth through the Twenty-fifth.
204
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that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute," for the purpose of defeating a Board hearing
under section 10(k). And, if there is actual settlement by the parties,
section 10(k) provides that the charge of a violation of section 8(b)
(4) (D) "shall be dismissed." The importance of a "voluntary adjustment of the dispute" is evident, since according to section 10(k), the
only other way by which a charge of an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice can be dismissed is "compliance by the parties to the dispute with
the decision of the Board." The Congressional purpose of putting private settlement of a jurisdictional dispute on an equal basis with a 10(k)
decision of the Board is clear. The Board recognized this equality in
the Acoustical Contractors Association of Cleveland case 206 when it
observed that "where there is an agreed upon method of private adjustment, the parties themselves have supplied the forum for hearing and
determining the dispute. ' ' 20 7 The significance of the private agreement

of adjustment is emphasized by the fact that the Board held in the
Acoustical Contractors Association case that an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair
labor practice hearing can be held "without the prerequisite of a hearing and determination under section 10(k) of the Act, if it appears that
there exists an agreed upon method of voluntary adjustment which has
208
Droken down in settling an underlying jurisdictional dispute."
If one of the parties contends that the National Labor Relations
Board is without jurisdiction to hear and determine a jurisdictional
controversy under section 10(k) because of the existence of a private
plan of settlement, the Board is again confronted with a substantive
issue which must be resolved on its merits. In fact, the Board must
decide upon the validity of this contention by weighing the evidence in
the same manner as it did in its determination of the reasonableness of
the charge that section 8(b) (4) (D) had been violated. This would
appear to be the correct interpretation of the Act since section 10(k)
provides that there must be "satisfactory evidence" of a voluntary adjustment or the existence of an agreement for a settlement to support a
dismissal of a 10(k) hearing. Since the Act does not provide that the
evidence of such an agreement or adjustment be "substantial" or "preponderant" but requires only that it be "satisfactory," the Board should
have authority to quash the notice of a 10(k) hearing if there is "reasonable cause" to believe that the parties have either adjusted or agreed
to adjust the jurisdictional dispute. And, just as the regional director
initially determines the "reasonable cause" of an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair
labor practice charge, it is also his initial responsibility to "determine
2

o Supra note 189.

L.R.R.M. 1293, 1299 (1958).
Id. at 1297. See also, supra note 189, and the Twenty-fifth Annual Report

20741

208

of the N.L.R.B., fiscal year 1960, 112 (1960).
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administratively whether or not there is such (an agreed upon) method
''
in existence. 209

We should at this point examine the important distinction between
an actual adjustment of a jurisdictional dispute by the parties and an
agreement by them to settle such a dispute, for section 10(k) provides
that "satisfactory evidence" of either is sufficient to dismiss the hearing
and determination of the dispute but is not enough to dismiss the charge
of an unfair labor practice. Only the actual adjustment can result in
dismissal of the charge of a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D). In the
Acoustical Contractors Association case, the Board, in discussing the
existence of an adjustment or an agreed upon method for adjustment
states: "If either exists, the Board's authority to make a determination
is terminated. Significantly, however, only compliance with this Board's
decision, if one is made, or an actual 'adjustment' of the dispute-and
not an agreed upon method-is ground for dismissal of the unfair
labor practice charge ....

The more reasonable inference to be drawn

from the statutory distinction is that the statute keeps the charge alive
pending a final settlement of the dispute so that 8(b) (4) (D) complaint
action may be taken against a party that resorts to a jurisdictional strike
despite the existence of an agreed method of adjustment." 210 It would
seem, therefore, if a party contends the existence of an actual voluntary
adjustment to defeat not only the Board's jurisdiction to hear and determine a jurisdictional dispute under section 10(k) but also to obtain
a dismissal of the 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice charge, the standard of proof required to support such a contention would have to be
more exacting than the submission by such party of "satisfactory" or
"reasonable" evidence. Such a position is consistent with the language
of section 10(k) which provides that the 8(b) (4) (D) charge is to be
dismissed if the parties either comply with the Board's 10(k) decision
or actually adjust the dispute themselves. The Board's resolution of the
question concerning the existence of an actual adjustment by the parties
must of necessity be decisive in character, for upon it depends not only
the Board's jurisdiction under section 10(k) but also its jurisdiction
under section 10(b) and 10(c) to prevent an unfair labor practice.
Certainly, the very existence of such a question compels adversity of
interests. The party charging a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) and
seeking a determination of the basic jurisdictional dispute would not
be the one to contend the existence of a voluntary adjustment. Such a
contention would be made only by a party denying the charge and opposing a hearing under section 10 (k).
But, by what type of proceeding does the Board consider the question concerning the existence of an agreement by the parties to settle a
209 Supra note 207, at 1298.
210 Supra note 207, at 1297.
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jurisdictional dispute in the future? In such a situation, the parties have
not actually settled their dispute, and the Board must decide if they are
in agreement as to how it should be settled. As we have seen, the standard of proof by which the Board determines the existence of an agreement to settle a jurisdictional dispute is merely that the Board is
"satisfied" that there is such an agreement since only the Board's jurisdiction to hear the dispute under section 10(k), and not dismissal of
the unfair labor practice charge, is involved. What about the "nonadversary character" of this phase of the proceeding? Do the parties have
adverse positions on this issue as they do on the existence of an actual
adjustment or the reasonableness of the 8(b) (4) (D) charge? Again,
the charging party, seeking to obtain a hearing and determination by the
Board under section 10(k), would not also contend that the parties
have agreed upon their own procedure for arbitrating the jurisdictional
dispute. The inconsistency of such a position is obvious. The charging
party would certainly be opposed to such a contention. The character
of this issue also compels adversity of interests. If the Board finds, for
example, that the evidence does not satisfactorily support the contention
of one of the parties that all of the parties have reached an agreement
to adjust their jurisdictional dispute, on that issue, the party so contending has lost, and the opposing party has won. It would be unrealistic to
hold that the hearing on such an issue was "nonadversary" and that the
Board had not in fact made a "decision." Or, suppose the position of
the party contending the existence of such an agreement is upheld by
the Board, and the notice of a 10(k) hearing is thereby quashed. Has
the party who sought the hearing lost his opportunity to be heard on
the basis of an advisory opinion resulting from a preliminary investigation? Or, did he lose after the National Labor Relations Board had
heard each side of the issue, weighed the evidence, and rendered a
decision? It is apparent that reality supports the latter view.
The subject of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board to hear and determine jurisdictional disputes under section 10(k)
can now be summarized. Suppose the Board not only decides that there
is "reasonable cause" to believe that section 8(b) (4) (D) has been violated but also decides, as it did for the first time in the Iruin-Lyons
case 211 and in many cases thereafter, that "the record is inconclusive"
as far as any type of voluntary adjustment is concerned. Technically,
the Board has settled only the procedural problem of its own jurisdiction to proceed under section 10(k) with the merits of the case. But
what is next? It is obvious the Board has done more than settle a problem of procedure. It is appropriate at this point to recall the Board's
administrative rule 12 that the Board is without jurisdiction to hear and
211 Supra note 146.
212 Supra note 166.
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determine a jurisdictional dispute unless the Board is reasonably convinced that certain picketing and strike activity of a disputing union has
violated section 8(b) (4) (D). If the Board assumes jurisdiction under
section 10(k), this would mean that the Board believes the charge of
an 8(b) (4) (D) violation is true. It also means that the Board is convinced the parties have not taken steps to settle the basic jurisdictional
dispute. Has not the Board in effect determined the jurisdictional dispute against the disputing union charged with the 8(b) (4) (D) violation? It would seem to follow that the type of 10(k) determination
rendered by the Board would be necessarily dependent upon its initial
procedural decision. Does the Board really have any other choice than
to determine a jurisdictional dispute against the union which the Board
has found, by assuming jurisdiction under section 10(k), reasonably
charged with violating the forced-work assignment provisions of section
8(b) (4) (D)? It is, of course, true that the most common type of
determination rendered by the Board has been to the effect that the
disputing union charged with an 8(b) (d) (D) violation "is not lawfully
entitled to force (the employer) to assign (the disputed work) to its
members rather than to employees already assigned the work who are
not its members." We can only conclude that under its present administrative rule of procedure, it would be inconsistent once the Board has
assumed jurisdiction under section 10(k) to determine subsequently,
as it has done in some cases, that the union charged with an 8(b) (4)
(D) violation has a contractual right to the work in dispute 214 or to

determine, as it has done in other cases, where each of the disputing
unions has representation status involving the same employer, that the
disputed work belongs within the bargaining unit represented by one
of them. 215 Now, the Board is told by the United States Supreme Court
Supra note 1.
In one of the leading jurisdictional dispute cases, the Board stated that in
11 years it had "made 65 determinations under section 10(k)" and went
on to comment: "In many such proceedings the Board has determined the
dispute 'on the merits' in the sense that it found that a particular labor
organization, by virtue of a contract and/or certification under section 9,
is entitled to strike to force the employer to assign the disputed work to
employees in the unit the labor organization represents." Local 173, Lathers
Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Newark & Essex Plastering Co.) 121 N.L.R.B. 1094,
42 L.R.R.M. 1519, 1523, n. 45 (1958). See, National Assn. of Broadcast Engineers, (N.B.C., Inc.) 105 N.L.R.B. 355, 32 L.R.R.M. 1268 (1953), and Local
1212, I.B.E.W., (C.B.S., Inc.) 114 N.L.R.B. 1354, 37 L.R.R.M. 1164 (1955),
wherein the Board determined jurisdictional disputes in favor of the disputing unions on the basis of contractual right. See also, Local 48, Sheet
Metal Workers, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Gadsden Heating & Sheet Metal Co.),
wherein the Board held that certain disputed work was "covered by the
contract and (the) union is lawfully entitled to require (the employer) to
assign such sheet metal work in accordance with the contract."
215 See, Newark & Essex case, supra note 214, and Chicago Typographical
Union (Central Typesetting & Electroplating Co.) 127 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 46
L.R.R.M. 1126 (1960), wherein the employer claimed an 8(b) (4) (D) violation and the Board stated: "We view the dispute presented as essentially
a disagreement between two unions as to which of the existing bargaining
213
214
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in the Columbia BroadcastingSystem case 1 6 that it must be affirmative
in its determination of jurisdictional disputes under section 10(k). It
must in such cases "decide which of two or more employee groups
claiming the right to perform certain work tasks is right and then specifically... award such tasks in accordance with its decision. 2 1 7 This,
of course, means that the Board has to decide in favor of the union
charged with the 8(b) (4) (D) violation if it finds that the facts support
a determination that members of that union are "entitled to do the work
in dispute. 2 18 It would be equally inconsistent, however, for the Board
to make such an affirmative 10(k) determination based on an administrative rule, under which the Board had exercised its jurisdiction, that
there was reason to believe that the union whose members the Board
has assigned the disputed work did in fact violate the National Labor
Relations Act by engaging in proscribed activity to force such an assignment. The Board's first affirmative determination, after the Columbia
Broadcasting System decision, was in the Valley Publishing Company
case. 21' The difficulty in reconciling the Board's administrative rule
upon which it assumes jurisdiction under section 10(k) with the determination in that case is obvious. It is necessary to reiterate that the
administrative rule to which we refer precludes the Board from hearing and determining a jurisdictional dispute unless the Board has "reasonable cause" to believe that section 8(b) (4) (D) has been violated.
After noting in its determination that the disputed work had been assigned in a contract between the employer and the Tacoma Printing
Pressmen's Union, the Board in the Valley Publishing Company case
assigned the work "to that union," and then stated: "Accordingly such
union is lawfully entitled to force (the) employer to assign such work
in accordance with (the) contract." 220 This means, then, that having
assumed jurisdiction under section 10(k) to make a determination of
the jurisdictional dispute in the Valley Publishing Company case, the
units appropriately includes the disputed work. It is therefore a dispute
which may be determined by making an appropriate unit determination."
Citing, Des Moines Electrotypers' Union (Meredith Publishing Co.) 125
N.L.R.B. No. 49, 45 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1959); Window Glass Cutters League,
A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.) 123 N.L.R.B. 1183, 44 L.R.R.M.
1094 (1959) ; Local 556, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, A.F.L., (Safeway Stores,
Inc.) 101 N.L.R.B. 181, 31 L.R.R.Ml. 1035 (1952) ; Local 26, Leather Workers
Union, (Winslow Bros. & Smith Co.) 90 N.L.R.B. 1379, 26 L.R.R.M. 1356
216
217
218
219

220

(1950).
Supra note 1.
Supra note 1, at 586.
Supra note 1, at 579.

Tacoma Printing Pressmen's Union, (Valley Publishing Co.) 131 N.L.R.B.
No. 133, 48 L.R.R.M. 1187 (1961). For a discussion of this "first decision
...
since the Board was told by the Supreme Court to make an affirmative
award of the disputed work in such cases," see, Labor Relations Reporter,
Vol. 48, No. 15, Summary of Developments, p. 2, Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc., Wash., D.C.

Id. 48 L.R.R.M. at 1188.
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Board had to be reasonably convinced that the disputing union, as
charged therein, was forcing the employer to assign work in violation
of section 8(b) (4) (D). But, the Board in its determination in that case
concludes that "such union is entitled to force (the) employer to assign
such work in accordance with (a) contract." The point is not that the
Board's determination was wrong but that if the disputing union did
in fact have a contractual right to the disputed work the Board could
not assume jurisdiction to hear the case under an administrative rule
which demands that the Board have "reasonable cause" to believe that
such a union is violating the forced work provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act. The Board, it seems, would be compelled to quash
the notice of a 10(k) hearing and not make any determination at all in
such a case. And, if the regional director thought in the beginning that
there was cause to believe that section 8(b) (4) (D) was being violated,
therefore assuming jurisdiction under the Board's administrative rule,
the Board would be obliged to quash the notice of a 10(k) hearing if
it subsequently discovers that section 8(b) (4) (D) has not been violated
because the union charged with the violation had a contractual right to
have the work in dispute assigned to its members.
Our discussion concerning the nature of the hearing under section
10(k) has been confined thus far to the primary question of the Board's
jurisdictional right to conduct such a hearing and to the effect of the
Board's answer to such question upon the type of determination it
renders under section 10(k). We have been compelled to conclude that
this initial phase of the 10(k) proceeding is adversary in nature and
decisive in result. But what of the 10(k) determination itself? Just
how decisive is it? The answer to this question depends upon an examination of the text and effect of the Board's determinations under section 10(k). The text of the 10(k) determination has usually been
expressed by the Board in two parts: (1) the statement of the Board's
resolution of the jurisdictional dispute in question, and (2) the "notice
provision" concerning compliance by the parties involved with the first
part of the determination.
As we have seen, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the Columbia BroadcastingSystem case, the first part of the 10(k) determination was expressed by the Board in a negative manner in the great majority of cases-that a certain union was not permitted to force an employer
to assign disputed work. As we have also observed, the Board has said
that the resolution of a jurisdictional dispute under section 10(k) is
not a "decision" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act 2 2 1 and that "it merely results in a 'determination' . . . and not in an
222
order enjoining unfair labor practices or directing affirmative action."
221 Supra note 195.
222 Supra note 190.
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Of course, it is quite correct that a 10(k) determination is not an order
to cease and desist unfair labor practice activity. 223 But, the Board's

statement would indicate that "mere determinations" are not "decisions." This position of the Board was either the cause or the result of
another position taken by the Board during the years preceding the
Columbia Broadcasting System case, namely, that the determinative
powers of the Board under section 10(k) were strictly negative in
character. The Board, therefore, insisted in case after case that although
it had determined that one of the disputing unions was "not lawfully
entitled to force" the employer to assign particular work to its members
it was not deciding that the class or group of employees to whom the
employer had in fact made the assignment were rightfully entitled to
the work.
It appears that the position of the National Labor Relations Board
regarding the decisiveness of the 10(k) determination which the Board
had taken before the decision in the Columbia Broadcasting System
case would be unaffected by that decision, for the Board's position that
the 10(k) determination is not a "decision" within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act seems to be based on the reason that the
10(k) hearing is not conducted for the purpose of deciding whether a
cease and desist order against an unfair labor practice should be issued
but for the purpose of helping the parties in a jurisdictional dispute
resolve their difficulties. So, it would seem even though the Board has
been told by the Supreme Court in the Columbia Broadcasting System
case to exercise powers of "compulsory determination" in jurisdictional
dispute cases the Board could continue its policy that such determinations are not "decisions," for if a negative determination-one stating
that a union has no right to the disputed work-is not a "decision,"
then it would follow that an affirmative determination-one stating that
a union does have a right to the disputed work-is also not a "decision."
But yet, we are urged to conclude that even a negative determination is
decisive in its text and in its effect. It is certainly conclusive to state that
a union is "not lawfully entitled to force" an assignment of work, and
the effect of such a determination is to exclude the members of that
union from performing the work in question, leaving undisturbed the
employer's assignment to non-union employees or to members of a
competing union. It therefore seems quite consistent with reality to
conclude that the first part of the Board's determination under section
10(k), whether negative or affirmative, contains the essential ingredients of an actual decision.

The second part of the Board's 10(k) determination deals with the
furnishing of a written notice to the regional director, concerning the
223

See, Board's statement in the Ship Scaling case, supra note 179, and the
discussion that followed.
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state of compliance with the first part of the determination; the notice
is to be submitted within ten days of the date of determination by the
party against whom it is directed. There have been several variations
in the text of this part of the 10(k) determination. In its early cases,
the Board couched its request for notification in permissive language.
Thus, in the Westinghouse case,2 2 4 the determination stated "within ten
days, each of the respondents may notify the regional director in writing what steps they have taken to comply with the terms of this decision
and determination.

2 25

The Board, in considering the determination,

held "that, because no affirmative action was required by the Board's
determination, the failure to notify the Regional Director of what was
or was not done does not alone establish noncompliance" with the determination.2 2 6 Subsequently, the Board expressed the second part of its
10(k) determinations in mandatory language by directing: "Within
ten days each of (the) respondents shall notify (the) regional director
in writing as to what steps they have taken to comply with the terms of
this decision and determination."227 Then, the Board again re-phrased
the language of this part of its 10(k) determination by stating: "(The)
Union shall within ten days notify (the) regional director in writing
whether or not it accepts (the) Board's determination of dispute and
whether or not it will refrain from forcing or requiring (the employer),
by means proscribed by (the) Act, to assign disputed work. .... ,,22

Finally, the Board settled on what might be described as a condensed
mandatory-permissive provision regarding notice under section 10(k) :
"Within 10 days, (the union) shall notify (the) regional director in
22 9
writing whether or not it will comply with this determination.
224 Supra note 151.
225 Supra note 151, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1092, (Italics supplied).
226 Los Angeles Building Trades Council, (Westinghouse Electric Corporation)
94 N.L.R.B. 415, 28 L.R.R.M. 1058, 1059 (1951).
227Locals 13 & 48, I.L.W.U., (Pacific Maritime Assn.) 94 N.L.R.B. 388, 28
L.R.R.M. 1055, 1058 (1951), (Italics supplied). See also, Local 556, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, A.F.L., (Safeway Stores, Inc.), supra note 215; National Assn. of Broadcast Engineers, (A-inerican Broadcasting-Paramount
Theatres, Inc.) 110 N.L.R.B. 1233, 35 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1954); Local 968,
Teamsters Union, (Farnsworth & Chambers) 115 N.L.R.B. 617, 37 L.R.R.M.
1359 (1956); Bay Counties Dist. Council, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (United Roofers
Union, Local 40) 115 N.L.R.B. 1757, 38 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1956).
228 Local 5, I.B.E.W., A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Pittsburgh's Great So. Shoppers Mart)
115 N.L.R.B. 1196, 38 L.R.R.M. 1020, 1022 (1956), (Italics supplied). See
also, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, (Kansas City Power & Light Co.) 115
N.L.R.B. 1411, 38 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1956); Local 675, Operating Engineers
Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Port Everglades Terminal Co.) supra note 201;
Carpenters Union, (Wendnagel & Co.) 116 N.L.R.B. 1063, 38 L.R.R.M. 1399
(1956) ; Local 562, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, (St. Louis County Water
Co.) 116 N.L.R.B. 1111, 38 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1956); Locals 976-4, 1277 &
1804, Longshoremen Assn., (Bush Terminal Co.) 116 N.L.R.B. 1383, 39
L.R.R.M. 1030 (1956); Operating Engineers Union, Local 825, (Building
Contractors Assn. of N.J.) 118 N.L.R.B. 978, 40 L.R.R.M. 1291 (1957).
229Local 4, I.B.E.W., (Pulitzer Publishing Co.) 129 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 47
L.R.R.M. 1106, 1109 (1960), (Italics supplied). This case represented the
last 10(k) determination of a jurisdictional dispute by the Board prior to
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This choice of language by the Board which allowed the parties to a
jurisdictional dispute the alternative of choosing not to comply with the
Board's determination of the dispute is interesting and important. The
fact that the Board in its most frequently used provision on notice did
not direct compliance with the 10(k) determination but instead wished
to know if the party against whom it was directed was going to comply
or not certainly implied that the determination was in the nature of an
advisory opinion. This was probably the result of the Board's position
that 10(k) determinations were not supposed to be decisive. There
seems to be no question that this part of the provision for notification
was permissive and not mandatory and at least supported the Board's
view, prior to the Columbia Broadcasting System case, that 10(k)
determinations were not effective as decisions. Yet, although the provision for notification was permissive, it was also mandatory, for it required the party against whom the determination was directed to inform
the Board as to whether the determination was going to be followed.
The word "shall" contained in the provision, therefore, becomes quite
important.
The National Labor Relations Board had occasion to interpret the
meaning of the mandatory phase of its own provision for notification
in the Bechtel Corporation case, 230 which is perhaps the leading case on
the subject. The determination under section 10(k) had been made in
an earlier case 23 1 with the provision for notification as follows: "Within
10 days (the specified parties) shall notify (the) regional director in
23 2
writing as to what steps they have taken to comply with these terms.
The Board held: "The word 'shall' in its common and ordinary meaning
always has a compulsory sense. . . . Failure to supply such notice in
the face of a positive requirement is equatable to a refusal. We do not
think it too much to expect that a union having a good-faith intent to
accept and abide by a 10(k) determination will comply without hesitadirector. 23 3
tion with a formal requirement of notice to the regional
The Board thus construed failure to notify the regional director as
equivalent to noncompliance. If this interpretation of the word "shall"
is applied to the Board's most recent expression regarding notice, an
unusual situation can result. This occurs if the party against whom a
the decision of the Supreme Court in the Columbia Broadcasting System
case, supra note 1. The provisions for notification in the Pulitzer Publishing
case was the type used by the Board during the several years preceding
that case.
230 Local 595, Iron -Workers Union, (Bechtel Corporation) 112 N.L.R.B. 812,
36 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1955).
23 Local 595, Iron Workers Union, (Bechtel Corporation) 108 N.L.R.B. 823,
34 L.R.R.M. 1087 (1954).
232 Id. 34 L.R.R.M. at 1089, (Italics supplied).
233 Supra note 230, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1107.
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10(k) determination is directed chooses not to comply and yet is required to notify the regional director of this fact.
There seems to be only one purpose for compelling the party named
in the 10(k) determination to notify the Board through its regional
director concerning his intention to comply with the determination.
The objective of notification is contained in the Board's conclusion in
the Bechtel case: "The General Counsel contends that the failure of
these Respondents to send a letter to the Regional Director within the
time specified in the notice provision constitutes noncompliance by them
and justifies his issuance of the instant 8(b) (4) (D) complaint ....

In

view of the foregoing, we hold that the failure of the respondents ...
gave rise to a presumption of noncompliance which warranted the General Counsel in issuing the complaint." 234 Therefore, if failure to send
a notice of intention to comply with a 10(k) determination gives rise
to the issuance of a complaint charging an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b) (4) (D), then it would follow that a notification of intention not to comply, by a party against whom such a determination is
directed, would also result in the issuance by the General Counsel of
such a complaint. This conclusion is supported by the Board's statement
in the Acoustical Contractors Association case :2 3 "(I)t would appear
that the initial effort must be made to settle the jurisdictional dispute underlying the charged unfair labor practice, either by an agreed upon
method of adjustment or by a determination under section 10(k).
Where neither serves in fact to settle the underlying dispute, the remedy
of a cease and desist order is required to stop the unfair labor prac2 36

tice."-

The Board's early interpretation of the effect of the 10(k) determination is also consistent with the view that failure to comply with
the determination would result in the issuance of a complaint charging
an 8(b) (4) (D) violation. We have seen that in its Fourteenth Annual
Report the Board stated that "when the parties thereafter fail to comply with the Board's determination of the dispute, .

.

. a complaint

(may) issue upon the charge under section 8(b) (4) (D) ; the case may
thereupon be processed to completion like any other unfair labor practice proceeding. ' 237 If the Board's provision for notification concerning
the state of compliance is in fact for the express purpose of instigating
an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice action for noncompliance with
the 10(k) determination, a sanction indeed exists if a labor organization
does not comply. The real dilemma for the Board if it continues to subscribe to the view that 10(k) determinations are not decisions, which
234

Id. at 1106, 1107.

235 Supra note 189.
236

Id. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1298.
note 190. See also, Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B.,
supra note 204.

237Supra
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we have seen is not a matter of whether the determination is affirmative
or negative, is that if the 10(k) determination were not a decision it
would be impossible to "fail to comply" with it. And, if the 10(k)
determination were not a decision but an advisory opinion, it would
seem inappropriate to conclude that a party not following it has actually
"failed" in anything; it would be more proper to state that the party
declined, or did not heed, the advice. Certainly, refusal to follow advice
would not result in being charged with an unfair labor practice. Therefore, when a labor organization has not complied with a 10(k) determination and is subsequently charged with a violation of section 8(b)
(4) (D) because of such noncompliance, it would follow that the determination was decisive in purpose and in effect, and not advisory. We
can only conclude that the 10(k) determination does in fact settle issues
and can be classified as a "decision."
Additional support for the decisiveness of the determinations by the
National Labor Relations Board under section 10(k) can be found in
the language of section 10(k) itself, for it provides that if there is
"compliance by the parties to the (jurisdictional) dispute with the
decision of the Board," the 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice "charge
shall be dismissed. ' 238 It is important to emphasize that section 10(k)
refers to a determination thereunder as a "decision of the Board." The
Board, as we have seen, has even referred on occasion to its 10(k)
determinations as decisions. This was done in the Westinghouse239 and
241
Pacific Maritime2 40 cases as well as in others.
It is true, of course, that a decision under section 10(k) is not selfenforceable but, for that matter, neither is the Board's cease and desist
order. The real difficulty, and this is what seems to have convinced the
National Labor Relations Board that a 10(k) determination is not a
decision, is that there is no express provision in the National Labor
Relations Act for judicial enforcement of determinations under section
10(k). The Board's right under section 10(e) 242 to seek injunctions
applies only to violations of the Board's cease and desist orders against
unfair labor practices. But even though a determination cannot be enforced, it would not necessarily follow that the determination is not a
"decision." And, if there is no provision in the National Labor Relations Act specifically authorizing judicial enforcement of the Board's
"old" negative determinations under section 10(k), there is also no
238 Supra note 122, (Italics supplied).

239 Supra note 225.
29 Supra note 227.
24
'Local 581, Carpenters Union (Ora Collard) 98 N.L.R.B. 346, 29 L.R.R.M.
1333 (1952); National Assn. of Broadcast Engineers, C.I.O., (N.B.C., Inc.)
supra note 214; Local 968, Teamsters Union, (Farnsworth & Chambers)
supra note 227; Local 16, I.L.W.U., (Denali-McCray Const. Co.) 118 N.L.R.B.
109, 40 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1957).
=2 Supra note 74.
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provision in the Act authorizing such enforcement of the Board's "new"
affirmative determinations pursuant to the decision in the Columbia
BroadcastingSystem case24 3 since there has been no amendment of the
National Labor Relations Act to effectuate the Supreme Court's recognition of the Board's power of "compulsory determination" under section 10(k). In any event, it seems appropriate to conclude that the
10(k) determination, whether negative or affirmative, is for the purpose
of preventing, by decision, conduct violative of section 8(b) (4) (D) of
the National Labor Relations Act rather than for the purpose of discouraging such violations through advisory opinions.
(To be concluded in Volume 45, Number 3, of the
Marquette Law Review.)

2

4

1

Supra note 1.

